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RECONSIDERING RES JUDICATA: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
YUVAL SINAI* 
“Res judicata changes white to black and black to white, it makes the 
crooked straight and the straight crooked.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Final judgments create legal barriers to relitigation. These barriers 
are the rules of res judicata (“RJ”), which means “a matter that has been 
adjudicated.”2 The term res judicata refers to the various ways in which one 
judgment exercises a binding effect on another. The rules of RJ have 
undergone a significant change in scope.3 In the old common law, its scope 
was quite narrow. A judgment entered in a case on one form of action did 
not prevent litigants from pursuing another form of action, although only 
one recovery was permitted for a single loss.4 With changes in the rules of 
litigation as part of the evolution of modern procedure, the scope of the 
rules of RJ is wider. The basic proposition of RJ, however, has remained 
the same: a party should not be allowed to relitigate a matter that it has 
already litigated.5 As the modern rules of procedure have expanded the 
scope of the initial opportunity to litigate, they have correspondingly 
limited subsequent opportunities to litigate a subsequent one.6 As we shall 
see, this is the clear tendency in the modern law of RJ. 
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 1. Bourrer's Institute of American Law, quoted in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 (4th ed. 
1945). 
 2.  See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 673 (5th ed. 2001). 
 3. See id. at 674-75. 
 4. See O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925). 
 5. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674-75. 
 6. Compare Ernst Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the 
Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 31 OR. L. REV. 319 (1942), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
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RJ is a classic common law doctrine that applies in the legal systems 
of both England7 and the United States.8 Some commentators are of the 
opinion that the doctrine is a necessary “product of the adversary system of 
litigation practised in English Courts,”9 or, as stated by some U.S. legal 
scholars, “[o]ur legal system could not exist without [RJ].”10 The doctrine 
of RJ is also a cornerstone of the Canadian legal system.11 
Many legal scholars believe that “every legal system has produced a 
body of [RJ] law,”12 and some scholars have made unequivocal statements 
to that effect. For instance, one legalist asserts that “[t]he doctrine of [RJ] is 
a principle of universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of 
all civilized nations.”13 Another legalist writes “[it] may be assumed that 
the need for finality of judgment is recognized by many, if not by all, 
systems of law.”14 A third writes that “[i]t seems clear that the adjudicative 
process would fail to serve its social and economic functions if it did not 
have [the support of RJ].”15 
In this Article I challenge these assumptions and show that some well 
known legal systems do not accept the main tenets of RJ. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate that these systems may reject RJ for good reasons: the rules of 
RJ raise many difficulties and have many drawbacks16—moral, conceptual, 
social, and economic—and create problematic incentives for litigating 
parties. Indeed, these difficulties and drawbacks do not necessarily lead to a 
 
§24 (1982). See also Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 
NW. U. L. REV. 357 (1967). 
 7. See, e.g., GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & ALEXANDER K. TURNER, THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
JUDICATA (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter BOWER]; NEIL ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 501-
12 (1994); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 24 (2d ed. 2006). 
 8.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982); ALLEN D. VESTAL, RES 
JUDICATA/PRECLUSION (1969); WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
(1988); ROBERT C. CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL (1976); ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. 
CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (2001); DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2001); JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 
671-712. 
 9. BOWER, supra note 7, at 13. 
 10.  CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 5 (answering the question whether societies would be 
better off without res judicata). 
 11. DONALD J. LANGE, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IN CANADA 4-10 (2d ed. 2004). 
 12. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 5. 
 13. A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 627 (5th ed. 1925). 
 14. Eliahu Harnon, Res Judicata and Identity of Actions: Law and Rationale, 1 ISR. L. REV. 539, 
539 (1966). 
 15. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674. 
 16. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 
YALE L.J. 339 (1948); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 33-34. The present Article introduces a 
larger number of policy considerations in its critique of the rules of res judicata. 
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full abandonment of the concept of RJ, for arguments support at least a 
minimal concept of RJ. Nevertheless, this Article presents arguments that 
should prompt us at least to reconsider the contemporary broad-scope 
common law model of RJ. 
Martin Shapiro claims that a chief purpose of comparative law should 
be to provide data for testing general theories about law.17 Indeed, 
examination of legal history reveals that the principle of finality did not 
always apply to cases, and parties could reopen a case in some legal 
systems. For example, in the procedural systems employed in Jewish 
rabbinical courts18 a unique concept of non-finality of judgments prevails.19 
This existed both in ancient Talmudic and post-Talmudic law, and still 
exists in present-day rabbinical courts in the State of Israel. 
Comparative law truly holds exciting potential to help us better 
understand law and legal systems, because it offers, as argued by John C. 
Reitz, at least two significant intellectual benefits that are not easily 
obtained outside the comparative method: “(1) the tendency to push 
analytic categories to higher levels of abstraction in order to bridge 
differences between legal systems, and (2) the tendency to force the 
researcher to expand the analysis to include the whole legal system and its 
relationship with the rest of human culture and its material and spiritual 
context in order to understand the differences and similarities observed.”20 
The present Article seeks to accomplish these two benefits of comparative 
law. Furthermore, Reitz asserts that “the comparative method has the 
potential to lead to even more interesting analysis by inviting the 
comparatist to give reasons for the similarities and differences among legal 
systems and to analyze their significance for cultures under study.”21 
Indeed, a good comparatist should consider not only global comparison of 
legal systems, but also similarities and differences in the respective 
political and historical traditions of which they are a part.22 This Article 
reveals both legal and cultural differences between Jewish tradition and 
dominant Western societies. 
Modern analyses of procedural rules among widely divergent legal 
systems have prompted many to question—and sometimes change—the 
 
 17. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, at vii (1980). 
 18. See generally Haim H. Cohn & Yuval Sinai, Practice and Procedure, in 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
JUDAICA 434, 434-46 (2d ed. 2007). 
 19. For the Jewish law perspective, see generally Moshe Chigier, The Doctrine of Res Judicata, 8 
JEWISH L. ANN. 127, 129-34 (1989). 
 20. John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 636 (1998). 
 21. Id. at 626. 
 22. Id. at 627. 
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rules in their own legal system, often importing these rules from other 
systems. A central axis of comparison runs between the adversarial system, 
practiced in common law countries such as England and the United States, 
and the inquisitorial system, practiced in the European continent. An 
additional axis of comparison extends between the adversarial-inquisitorial 
systems on the one hand and the procedural system of Jewish law on the 
other. The body of legal literature that compares these systems takes into 
account not only legal rules but also cultural differences between Judaism 
and dominant Western society. Some scholars believe that Jewish law 
provides a basis for the reform and development of Western law.23 In the 
United States, some scholars use—and often reinterpret—Jewish law to 
provide a counter-model to dominant conceptions in contemporary U.S. 
legal theory.24 The comparative research presented below can serve as a 
paradigm for dealing with the subject of procedure in light of the conflict 
between common law, European Continental law, and Jewish law. The 
present article analyzes the justifications, advantages, and disadvantages of 
three models of RJ: (a) the broad-scope common law model; (b) the 
narrow-scope German–Continental model; and (c) the non-finality of 
judgments model prevalent in Jewish Law. Nevertheless, the present 
Article does not show, for instance, why and how the Jewish system should 
be followed by common law RJ systems. 
 Part I presents an overview of the broad common law model of RJ 
and the main justifications for the rules of RJ. Analysis shows that the best 
reason for accepting the rules of RJ in Anglo-American law should be 
based on the “conflict solving” approach of the adversarial system rather 
than on many of the more traditional justifications, which are more 
rhetorical arguments than sensible rationales. 
Part II contains an extensive analysis of conceptual arguments against 
the common law rules of RJ from three major perspectives: (a) the behavior 
modification model; (b) the valued features of the adversarial process; and 
(c) economic cost efficiency. I argue that the rules of RJ are not consistent 
with several important aspects of the behavior modification model, that the 
doctrine does not necessarily contribute to an economically efficient legal 
system, and that it contradicts many of the prized features of Anglo-
American procedure, such as litigant autonomy, litigants’ opportunities to 
plead their case, correctness, revisionism, and consistency. 
 
 23. See, e.g., PATRICK GLENN, THE LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 120-21 (2007). 
 24. See Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in 
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993). For an example of a 
comparative research dealing with procedural law, see Yuval Sinai, Affirmative Defenses in Civil 
Cases: Between Common Law and Jewish Law, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 111 (2008). 
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Part III reviews the narrow continental model of RJ applied in 
Germany. Although this model appears to be superior according to the 
three standards noted above to the broader common law rules of RJ, its cost 
efficiency raises some difficulties. 
Part IV reviews the unique non-finality of judgments model practiced 
in Jewish Law, in which the judge can reconsider his initial decision and 
render a revised decision if needed, resulting in an efficient judicial process 
of error correction. I also examine the balanced approach of Jewish Law, 
from the perspectives of behavior modification and cost efficiency, with 
regard to the doctrine of cause of action/issue preclusion. The unique 
concept of the non-finality of judgment is a central feature of the Jewish 
legal system, a system of law in which all elements of justice are 
subordinated to the discovery of the truth, and which was not designed 
exclusively to promote conflict resolution, as arguably is the case with the 
common law. 
Part V presents a comparative analysis of the three models and argues 
that the non-finality of judgments system practiced in the Jewish law model 
is preferable in many respects to the common law or the German models of 
RJ, although some good arguments support at least a minimal concept of 
RJ. 
I. FIRST MODEL: BROAD-SCOPE RES JUDICATA 
A. Overview of the Common law Rules of RJ 
In common law systems the doctrine of RJ has two main forms: in 
England25 and Canada,26 the forms are called “issue estoppel” and “cause of 
action estoppel;” in U.S. terminology, the two forms are referred to as 
“issue preclusion” (traditionally known as “collateral estoppel”) and “claim 
preclusion” respectively.27 In Arnold v. National Westminster Bank,28 the 
House of Lords explained these two forms, as they are applied in English 
common law, as follows: 
Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later 
proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter 
having been between the same parties or their privies and having 
 
 25. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 503. 
 26. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 1. 
 27. See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 8, at 13-15. 
 28. Arnold v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, [1991] 2 A.C. 93 (H.L.) [104-05] (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
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involved the same subject matter . . . . [The] bar is absolute in relation 
to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged . . . .29 
“Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary 
ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in 
subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different 
cause of action to which the same issue is relevant one of the parties seeks 
to re-open that issue.”30 
There is an important requirement in English law: in both cause of 
action and issue estoppels,31 the estoppel applies not only to points that 
have actually been decided but also to points “which properly belonged to 
the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable 
diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”32 It is emphasized by 
Zuckerman: “[t]he bar to advancing an identical cause of action is 
absolute.”33 
Similar definitions and distinctions between issue and cause of action 
estoppel are accepted in the Canadian legal system.34 The key principles 
governing cause of action estoppel in Canadian courts35 are similar to the 
English ones: “the plaintiff must present the subject matter of the entire 
case relating to the cause of action at one time, once and for all; and any 
remedy following from the cause of action is based on that subject matter.” 
The same principle applies to defendants.36 All subject matter germane to 
the claim or defense that could have been presented in the first action by 
exercise of reasonable diligence, but was not, is estopped in a second 
action.37 
 
 29. Id. at 104. 
 30. Id. at 105. 
 31. See ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 504. 
 32. Henderson v. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115; 67 E.R. 313, 320. 
 33. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 7, at 939. The author comments further: 
Neither the discovery of new evidence that could not have been known before, nor a change 
in the law since the first decision, can justify reopening an adjudicated cause of action. The 
only way of reviving the cause of action is by having the original judgment set aside on 
grounds of fraud. 
Id. at 939-40. 
 34. See, e.g., LANGE, supra note 11, at 4. 
 35. The key principles were quoted approvingly in Laufer v. Canadian Investment Protection 
Fund, [2004] O.J. No. 4016, para. 7 (S.C.J.). See id. at 125. For the key principles of issue estoppel, see 
id. at 25. 
 36. Id. In other words, the defendant must present both the entire defense related to the subject 
matter at one time, once and for all, and any related counterclaim that is not a separate and distinct 
cause of action. See id. 
 37. A separate and distinct cause of action, however, is not governed by the cause of action 
estoppel and need not to be brought in the same action, either as a claim by the plaintiff or as a 
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The U.S. legal system uses similar definitions and distinctions. In U.S. 
terminology, “claim preclusion” refers to the effects of a former judgment 
on a second action, when the second action proceeds on all or part of the 
claim that was the subject of the first action.38 The judgment “bars” or 
annuls the entire cause of action or claim, including items that were not 
raised in the former action. The U.S. Supreme Court formulated the 
concept of claim preclusion as a final judgment on the merits that were or 
could have been raised in that action.39 But what does the term “claim” 
mean for RJ purposes? The old view and the modern one differ.40 The 
present trend in the United States is to regard a “claim” in factual terms and 
make it coterminous with the transaction, irrespective of what substantive 
theories or forms of relief may be available to the plaintiff; irrespective of 
what or how many primary rights may have been infringed upon; and 
irrespective of how different the evidence needed to support the theories or 
rights may be.41 The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity, 
and it cannot be divided. In other words, according to the modern, 
transactional view of RJ, the plaintiff should fully litigate all grievances 
arising from a transaction in a single lawsuit, just as the plaintiff would do 
under the modern rules of procedure.42 As Casad commented, the rationale 
of this transactional view “is that this view increases efficiency, with an 
acceptable burden on fairness.”43 
The concept of claim preclusion is also referred to as “the rule against 
splitting a single cause of action.”44 The bar of a judgment for the 
defendant extinguishes the entire cause of action or claim, including items 
of the claim that were not in fact raised in the former action.45 The plaintiff 
can no longer sue on the original cause of action or any item of it even if 
 
counterclaim by the defendant. Another key principle is that the cause of action estoppel applies to the 
same parties and their privies, in the second action and in a second proceeding that is not an action. See 
generally id. 
 38. See JAMES, supra note 2, at 675-76. 
 39. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 40. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 62: 
[T]he old view, to which some jurisdictions still adhere, defines cause of action more 
narrowly in terms of a single theory or a single substantive right or remedy of the plaintiff. 
The modern view is that a claim includes all theories' bestowal of rights on the plaintiff to 
remedies against the defendant with respect to the transaction from which the action arose. 
(emphasis in original). 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). 
 42. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 62. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676. 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17 cmt. b, 19 (1982).  
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that item was omitted from the original action.46 A second effect of RJ, 
referred to in the United States as “issue preclusion,” is that an issue 
adjudicated in a prior action cannot be relitigated if it arises in a later action 
based on a different claim or demand.47 
The present Article deals mainly with claim preclusion and especially 
with the rule against splitting a claim/cause of action. As we have seen, in 
common law systems a plaintiff who obtains a judgment on a cause of 
action cannot initiate a second action on the same cause of action, although 
some exceptions to the general rule have been carved out in some common 
law systems in unusual circumstances.48 For example, Rules 59 and 60 of 
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe diverse circumstances 
in which an American federal court might reopen a case to correct a case.49 
Injunctions are generally open to reconsideration if erroneous.50 
B. Rationale and Justifications 
1. Public Policy and Individual Rights 
The justification for the common law rules of RJ has been debated 
extensively by legal scholars.51 In Anglo-American legal systems, this 
justification is usually based on two theories.52 First, it is in the general 
public interest to end disputes that have already been litigated by 
establishing the finality of judicial decisions.53 Lord Simon of Gaisdale 
expressed this idea: 
 
 46. See id. § 17 cmt. a, 18.  
 47. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676. 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982); BOWER, supra note 7, at 149-151, 
378-80 (for the doctrine of RJ in England); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 85-106 (for the 
doctrine of RJ in the U.S.); LANGE, supra note 11, at 231-84 (for the doctrine of RJ in Canada); 
VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103. 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60. Similar rules abide in most, perhaps all, state courts. Also note the 
law-equity distinction and the willingness of American "chancellors" to correct mistakes in the ancient 
tradition of Chancery. For the rise of equity and the chancellor's decree in United States, see JAMES ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 16-22. 
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 789-90. 
 51. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29 (1964); see 
generally Harnon, supra note 14, at 542-50; BOWER, supra note 7, at 10-15; VESTAL, supra note 8, at 
7-12; CLEARY, supra note 16; ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511; Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 444-45 (1973); 
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 29-38; JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 671-74; LANGE, supra 
note 11, at 4-9. 
 52. See, e.g., BOWER, supra note 7, at 10-11; VESTAL, supra note 8, at 8-9; Vestal supra note 51. 
 53. See, e.g., Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. [1967] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 853 (U.K.). 
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There is a fundamental principle of English law . . . generally 
expressed by a Latin maxim which can be translated: “It is in the 
interest of society that there should be some end to litigation . . . .” 
Important though the issues may be, how extensive so ever the 
evidence, whatever the eagerness for further fray, society says: “We 
have provided courts in which your rival contentions have been heard. 
We have provided a code of law by which they have been adjudged. 
Since judges and juries are fallible human beings, we have provided 
appellate courts which do their own fallible best to correct error. But in 
the end you must accept what has been decided. Enough is enough.” 
And the law echoes: “res judicata, the matter is adjudged.”54 
The second justification for RJ is the individual’s right of protection 
from repetitive litigation. This rationale of RJ was formulated more than 
four centuries ago by Lord Coke in the Ferrer case: 
[O]therwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence 
of law; for if there should not be an end to suits, then a rich and 
malicious man would infinitely vex him who hath right by suits and 
actions; and in the end (because he cannot come to any end) compel 
him (to redeem to his charge and vexation) to leave and relinquish his 
right . . . .55 
Canadian courts also traditionally base RJ upon these two policy 
considerations,56 as evident in the judgment by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Clark v. Phinney, which indicates that RJ must be applied 
because of the following public policy reasons: “[T]hat judgment must 
conclude the parties and negative the defence here as well upon the ground 
of public policy.” 57 
2. Economic Efficiency of the Courts 
Another common justification for the RJ rules is the need to end 
litigation in order to ensure the economic efficiency of the courts and the 
speedy termination of controversies. The doctrine of RJ is thus applied to 
avoid squandering the courts’ resources and imposing additional costs on 
the litigants.58 Litigating the same matter more than once defeats this 
purpose.59 
 
 54. The Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] A.C. (H.L.) 547 at 575-76 (U.K.). 
 55. Ferrer v. Arden (1599) 77 Eng Rep. 263, 266; 6 Co. Rep. 7 a (Eng.). 
 56. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 4-6. 
 57. Clark v. Phinney [1896] S.C.R. 633, 642-44 (Can.). 
 58. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that these policy considerations have been expressed 
also by the Canadian courts). 
 59. See Vestal, supra note 6, at 31-32; VESTAL, supra note 8, at 10-12. 
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3. Consistency and Stability 
RJ is also justified as a means to reduce controversies and disputes 
and to promote stability,60 an important requirement of judgments of the 
court.61 It is in the public interest to seek to prevent, or at least reduce, the 
possibility of inconsistent judgments.62 Inconsistent judgments undermine 
the courts’ prestige and the respect the courts inspire.63 According to some 
Anglo-American jurists, RJ supports the prestige of the courts.64 Moreover, 
courts tend to respect the decisions of other courts, a practice that fosters a 
general attitude that later decisions should be consistent with earlier ones. 
Canadian courts also agree that the doctrine of RJ avoids conflicting 
decisions and promotes both confidence in the courts and predictability.65 
4. Summary 
The English jurist Andrews sums up the dominant Anglo-American 
rationale and justification of RJ: 
The “principle of finality” is rooted in several inter-related policies. If 
a decision were not treated as final, many inconveniences would result: 
the dispute would continue to drag on; greater legal expense and delay 
would result; scarce “judge-time” would be spent re-hearing the 
matter; inconsistent decisions might follow; litigation would cease to 
be a credible means of settling disputes; finally, it would be a hardship 
on the victorious party if the first case were to be re-opened; the victor 
is entitled to assume that at the first action he was not merely attending 
a dress rehearsal for further performances.66 
Some of these policies raise issues of private justice between the 
parties, upholding their expectations that the judgment will not be 
undermined by later proceedings and protecting each party from delaying 
tactics. But most of the arguments are expressions of public policy: 
[T]he promotion of economical litigation; the need to ration judicial 
and other court time and resources; avoidance of inconsistent 
decisions; prevention of additional delay in the disposal of litigation; 
 
 60. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 675; Harnon, supra note 14, at 544. 
 61. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 675 (noting that the importance lies not only in that the 
parties and others can rely on the judgments in ordering their practical affairs and be protected from 
repeated litigation, but also in upholding the moral force of court judgments). 
 62. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511. 
 63. See, e.g., State Hosp. v. Consol. Water Co., 267 Pa. 29, 38 (1920) ("The doctrine of res 
judicata . . . produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial 
proceedings."). 
 64. See VESTAL, supra note 8, at 12; Harnon, supra note 14, at 544; Vestal, supra note 6, at 33. 
 65. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 7. 
 66. ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511. 
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preserving the authority of courts to reach decisions which will be 
presumptively binding. . . These considerations of public policy and 
private justice apply most clearly to the general rule set out above of 
cause of action and issue estoppels.67 
C. RJ and the Adversarial System 
I maintain that the traditional justifications presented above are not the 
major reason for accepting RJ in its broad scope. A legal system that favors 
a broad-scope RJ, such as the common law, reflects an approach that in 
principle emphasizes such values as public interest, consistency, stability, 
and efficiency over revealing the truth. However, in modern common law, 
RJ is often not applied in a way consistent with the major justifications 
provided by the common law jurists.68 Furthermore, Anglo-American law 
accepts only a relative concept of RJ, rather than the absolute concept 
described above. 
For example, to consider a plea of RJ, courts expect the parties to raise 
it explicitly,69 because courts will not do so on their own initiative.70 This 
approach reflects undue emphasis on the private interest of the parties in 
applying RJ, rather than on the public interest. It also shows that in Anglo-
American law RJ is applied not according to the main justification of the 
public interest. If the main rationale for RJ were indeed the public interest, 
the litigants’ wishes or convenience would be of no relevance to a 
determination of RJ. The decisive factor would be the mere fact that a 
former judgment on the same case already exists. After a judgment has 
been handed down and the court has settled the controversy between the 
parties, further resort to the court on the same matter would be a waste of 
courts’ time.71 But, in the Anglo-American view, the court can ignore 
former judgments if nobody complains of being vexed or harassed.72 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 544-49. 
 69. Id. at 549. 
 70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 1(a) (1942) ("Although the 
principle is based upon the interest of the public as well as that of the parties, yet if the prior judgment 
is not relied upon in pleadings or in evidence in the new action, the prior judgment will not preclude the 
new litigation of matters determined by the judgment. The court does not take judicial notice of the 
existence of the defense of res judicata."). 
 71. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 547. 
 72. Of course, the fact that the American legal system sometimes values procedure over substance 
does not necessarily stand for the proposition that the system does not value fair results. In addition, the 
fact that an issue will not be re-litigated absent a party’s request is probably more a reflection of the 
adversary system than any reflection of the system’s lack of concern for a just outcome; in the United 
States, judges cannot re-open cases sua sponte. Furthermore, some U.S. court decisions tend to deviate 
from the above principle and permit the court to initiate RJ. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
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Although the public interest rationale of RJ is justified by the general 
trend to promote stability, certainty, and consistency, in practice modern 
Anglo-American rules often do not promote these values. For example, the 
major trend in the development of the modern doctrine of RJ expands the 
theoretical applicability of the preclusion rules,73 at the same time 
recognizing and generating ever more broad exceptions to this doctrine.74 
For example, English law provides that new evidence unavailable at the 
time of trial can constitute under certain circumstances an exception to the 
application of RJ.75 
Some commentators question the desirability of many aspects of this 
trend.76 It is clear that this trend does not contribute to certainty and 
consistency, because in many cases it is not clear whether the action under 
preclusion or it fits into one of the exeptions. Although, in many cases, all 
the factors of the action appear to support a general rule of preclusion, in 
any individual case, these same factors may call for non-preclusion, 
justifying a special exception to the rule. Another factor causing 
uncertainty and inconsistency is the variety of definitions offered by 
judges, scholars, and statute-writers to the phrase “cause of action”: the 
broader the definition, the broader the scope of preclusion. Despite the 
attempts made to find an acceptable definition of “cause of action,”77 no 
consensus has been reached.78 
It appears, therefore, that RJ should be understood in the Anglo-
American systems as a product of the competing private interests that are 
valued in the adversarial system, rather than as a principle rooted in the 
traditional proffered justifications, which appear to be more rhetorical than 
actual bases for RJ. The explanation of the well-known English jurist John 
Salmond illustrates this contention: 
A judgment is conclusive evidence as between the parties, and 
sometimes against all the world, of the matter adjudicated upon. The 
 
United States, 688 F.2d 767, 771 (Ct. Cl. Sept. 8, 1982); Walsh v. Int’l Longshoremen's Ass’n, 630 F. 
2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1980); Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 73. For the wider modern scope of finality, see JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674-75. 
 74. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 36. Exceptions to RJ are indicated in the sources 
cited infra note 131. 
 75. See e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 505. 
 76. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 36. 
 77. For a summary of the different definitions see JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 684-88. See also 
Cleary, supra note 16, at 341-42 (criticizing the extensive efforts to define cause of action). 
 78. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 550-59. Furthermore, in my opinion, it is not easy to justify RJ 
on the grounds of the public interests to prevent inconsistent judgments and to contribute the prestige of 
courts. Is the law always against inconsistent judgments? By granting a right of appeal the law in fact 
invites such possible inconsistencies. 
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Court of Justice may make mistakes but no one will be heard to say so. 
For their function is to terminate disputes and their decisions must be 
accepted as final beyond question.79 
RJ is justified by the view that the function of the courts is “to 
terminate disputes.” This view is typical of the adversarial system, but it is 
doubtful whether it would be accepted by other legal traditions that hold 
different conceptual views about the role of the court. Bower and Turner 
maintained that the doctrine of RJ “is the product of the adversary system 
of litigation practised in English Courts. Its essence is that as between 
opposed parties an issue, once litigated, should be regarded as for ever 
decided.”80 They added that, “in a different system of jurisprudence where 
the court exercised an inquisitorial function, it might be thought unjust or 
inexpedient that it should be impeded in its search for truth by the principle 
res judicata . . . . But this is not the system under which English courts 
administer justice . . . .”81 
In The Faces of Justice and State Authority, Mirjan Damaska stated 
that the doctrine of RJ can be justified only by the conflict-solving model 
of the Anglo-American adversarial legal system.82 According to this 
approach, the conflict-solving style of proceedings used in common law 
systems is averse to changing decisions, even if they are based on legal or 
factual error, because substantively correct outcomes are relatively less 
important to adversarial legal systems operating in reactive governments.83 
The great desire for stability, typical to common law adversarial systems, 
produces a broad preclusion effect on future litigation.84 In the conflict-
solving, purely adversarial model, reconsideration of decisions “can occur 
only on the initiative of the parties, not as part of the court’s official 
duty.”85 Damaska concludes his analysis of RJ as follows: 
To an outside observer, a system of justice may seem seriously 
flawed—perhaps even perverse—where fairness of procedure can 
justify a substantively erroneous decision and where faulty procedures 
can undermine substantively correct decisions:86 the cart appears to be 
 
 79. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 484 (Williams eds., 10th ed. 1947) (1920). 
 80. BOWER, supra note 7, at 13-14 (emphasis in original). 
 81. Id. at 14. 
 82. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 145-46 (1986). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 86. 
 86. This is related to another important feature of the res judicata rules under common law, as 
Damaska points out: 
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put before the horse. But in a justice administration that values the 
integrity of the contest above the attainment of accurate outcomes on 
the merits, this result seems perfectly normal and acceptable.87 
The role of an adversarial trial judge is generally compared with that 
of a referee in a game in which he plays no active part,88 his function being 
restricted to ensuring that the parties comply with the rules of the game.89 
The adversarial system has been compared to a competition in which the 
party breaching the rules of the game incurs a technical loss, and the winner 
is determined by comparing the parties’ competitive levels at the end of the 
game.90 Many scholars are of the opinion that the major goal of the judge in 
the adversarial system is not to reveal the truth but to resolve disputes and 
to choose between the contentions of law and fact laid before him by the 
litigants.91 In this type of legal system, the rules of RJ, favoring values 
other than truth finding, and the fact that the courts do not consider the 
rules of RJ on their own initiative, make more sense.92 
II. CRITIQUE OF RJ: CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES 
A. General Methodological Goals 
As illustrated above, some justifications exist for at least a minimal 
application of RJ. However, the rules of RJ also create many conceptual 
difficulties and have many drawbacks. These difficulties, nonetheless, do 
not necessarily invalidate the concept of RJ, but they should prompt us to 
reconsider the contemporary broad-scope common law model of RJ. 
British jurists have voiced criticisms of the doctrine of RJ, but the 
principal questions they have raised concern individual aspects of the 
 
While even substantively erroneous decisions can enjoy a high degree of immunity from 
subsequent change, this immunity does not extend to decisions obtained through unfair 
practice or fraud. Where the winner of the forensic contest has engaged in some sort of "foul 
play," subsequent discovery and revelation of his misconduct may revive the dispute laid to 
rest in the decision. Res judicata loses its bindingness when it does not emanate from a fair 
contest: fraus omnia corrumpit (fraud spoils everything). 
Id. at 145. 
 87. Id. 
 88.  See Jones v. Nat’l Coal Bd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 55 at 63 (Eng.). 
 89. See id. 
 90.  Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 581 (1973). 
 91. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1998); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READING ON ADVERSARIAL 
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 3 (1988); cf. Marvin Frankel, The Search for 
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1975) (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth 
too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve.”). 
 92. Cf., e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-8. 
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doctrine and matters of detail, rather than the doctrine as a whole.93 In an 
article published in 1948, Edward Cleary initiated a reexamination of RJ,94 
but the conceptual difficulties of the doctrine have yet to be thoroughly 
examined in general. The following critique of RJ has three major 
methodological goals: to (a) reexamine the rules of RJ in light of the 
behavior modification model; (b) establish whether the doctrine of RJ 
serves the ostensibly valued features of the adversarial systems; and (c) 
evaluate the economic efficiency of RJ. 
1. Reexamining RJ in the Light of the Behavior Modification Model 
In his essay, Kenneth Scott presents two models of the civil process: 
the conflict resolution model and the behavior modification model.95 The 
conflict resolution model regards civil procedure “primarily as a method of 
achieving peaceful settlement of private disputes.”96 In the interests of 
preserving the peace, society offers through the courts a mechanism for 
impartial judgment of personal grievances as an alternative to retaliation or 
forcible self-help. By contrast, the behavior modification model “sees the 
courts and the civil process as a way of altering behavior by” exacting a 
price for undesirable behavior.97 The emphasis, in this case, is not on “the 
resolution of the immediate dispute but [on] its effect on the future conduct 
of others.”98 Scott argues that these two models conflict only if the first is 
taken as exclusive, as defining the outer bounds of the proper use of the 
civil process. Presently, that seems too often to be the case. “The Conflict 
Resolution Model is in the ascendant, and its implications seem to be 
carrying the day, at least in the federal courts.”99 Scott “urge[s] a more 
careful consideration of the claims and implications of the behavior 
modification model.”100 RJ defines the outer bounds of the civil process, so 
we should conduct a careful consideration of the implications of the 
behavior modification model on RJ. 
 
 93. See BOWER, supra note 7, at 12: 
It has been questioned, for instance, whether judgments by default ought always to have the 
same authority, binding the parties by estoppel per rem judicatam, as judgments in which the 
issues have been decided after contest; and, again, whether judgments in foreign courts should 
not be more carefully examined, before being held to be binding by estoppel, than domestic 
judgments. 
 94. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 95. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-40 (1975). 
 96. Id. at 937. 
 97. Id. at 938. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 950. 
 100. Id. 
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2. Does RJ Serve the Valued Features of Adversarial Systems? 
RJ is considered to be the product of the conflict resolution model of 
the adversarial system of litigation practiced in English and U.S. courts. 
The premise of U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as indicated in Rule 
1, is that “they should be construed and administered to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”101 
But in practice, the effects of RJ are not consistent with some of the main 
characteristics of the Anglo-American system. In the following sections I 
reexamine the doctrine of RJ in light of some of the twelve valued features 
of the procedural system, as identified by Judith Resnik,102 such as litigant 
autonomy, litigants’ persuasion opportunities, correctness, revisionism, 
consistency, and economy.103 The reexamination reveals that RJ stands in 
tension with many of these features. 
3. Economic Efficiency 
A major feature of civil procedure is ensuring that the legal system 
produces results with the least possible expenditure of time, money, and 
energy.104 Economic considerations legitimize the outcomes on the ground 
that the decisions are rendered with the interests of both the individual and 
society in mind.105 Many consider RJ to contribute significantly to the 
economic efficiency of the courts. But others consider this justification to 
be insufficient, as Edward Cleary argued: 
Courts exist for the purpose of trying lawsuits. If the courts are too 
busy to decide cases fairly and on the merits, something is wrong. 
Decision solely in terms of the convenience of the court approaches the 
theory that the individual exists for the state. Maintenance of the 
judicial system is a very minor portion of the cost of government. If 
the judges are too few to be able to decide cases fairly and on the 
merits, the public probably can afford to have more judges.106 
“Decisions about whether and how to economize often occur at points 
of tension between individuals’ and the public’s needs,” and cutting costs 
can mean sacrificing other valued needs, as in the case of RJ.107 Even if we 
reject Cleary’s view, the doctrine of RJ remains problematic in many ways. 
 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 102. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 844-59 (1984). 
 103. Resnik identifies six other values that are not relevant to our discussion because they deal with 
the structure of the decisionmakers’ system. See generally id. 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 857-58; JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 381-83. 
 105. Resnik, supra note 102, at 857. 
 106. Cleary, supra note 16, at 348. 
 107. Resnik, supra note 102, at 857. For another example of the tension between individual and 
public needs, see id. 
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As illustrated below, RJ does not necessarily contribute to producing an 
economically efficient legal system.108 
B. Litigants’ Perspective 
1. Litigant Autonomy 
The first valued feature of the adversarial system that Resnik mentions 
is litigant autonomy.109 In the Anglo-American adversarial system, 
litigation is generally prosecuted by the parties, not by the court, for each 
party knows best how to manage its own affairs and should therefore 
conduct its own litigation.110 The value at stake is the preservation of 
individual freedom in democratic society, and litigants express this 
freedom by conducting their own legal affairs.111 The judge expresses these 
values through self-restraint and not interfering in the proceedings.112 
In the Anglo-American system, litigants can make their way alone, 
define the parameters of their disputes, and select the types of relief sought. 
In this approach, the parties are free to press or waive points as they see fit, 
and society’s interest in guaranteeing the citizens’ legal rights is adequately 
served by the parties enforcing their self-interest.113 
Clearly, the concept of RJ contradicts the litigants’ autonomy—
especially when dealing with claim preclusion, which forces the plaintiff to 
present the entire case relating to the cause of action as well as every 
remedy sought at one time, once and for all. James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf 
note the conflict between the two fundamental goals of civil procedure: 
On the one hand, the procedural system aims to permit full 
development of the contentions and evidentiary possibilities of the 
various parties so that the case is decided on the merits. On the other 
hand, the system also aims to bring an adjudication to a final 
conclusion with reasonable promptness at a reasonable cost. By and 
 
 108. I accept the more balanced view expressed by Casad & Clermont: 
A fuller explanation of the policies that detail res judicata would recognize that efficiency 
factors can counsel not only for but also against preclusion. Moreover, although some 
arguments that draw instead on fairness do favor preclusion, powerful fairness concerns cut 
the other way, counseling either to stop the rule of res judicata short of the particular case or 
to create an exception to the rule of res judicata for the particular case. Finally, res judicata 
does not exist in a procedural vacuum, but responds to specific substantive policies as well. 
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 30-31. 
 109. Resnik, supra note 102, at 845-47. 
 110.  See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE 
L.J. 480, 535 (1975). 
 111.  See id. 
 112. See id.. 
 113. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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large, modern procedure gives greater weight to the first of these 
objectives during the course of a proceeding.114 
The rules permit the presentation of alternative positions and 
considerable freedom in developing both claim and defense during the trial. 
Similar liberality should be allowed after the judgment, as noted by James, 
Hazard, and Leubsdorf: 
There is, in principle, no reason why the rules of res judicata could not 
be limited to the narrow question whether the prior action actually 
decided the issues necessarily involved in awarding the judgment. This 
could be called a minimal concept of res judicata; without it, a 
judgment would not conclusively decide anything. It seems clear that 
the adjudicative process would fail to serve its social and economic 
functions if it did not have this minimal effect.115 
2. Litigants’ Persuasion Opportunities 
The second valued feature, litigants’ persuasion opportunities, reflects 
a belief that [a dispute should be resolved] only after the parties have had 
an opportunity to be heard” by the judge. 116 The persuasion opportunities 
of litigants are a valued feature mainly because of their relationship to 
outcomes, as explained by Resnik: 
[P]ersuasion opportunities provide an information basis for case 
disposition. If one assumes the possibility of “correctness,” of results 
that accurately reflect fact and law, then the information obtained 
through persuasion enhances decisionmakers’ abilities to base their 
conclusions on the “true” facts, to apply the law “correctly,” and to 
provide the “right” remedy.117 
Errors cannot always be corrected in the appellate court, and the rules 
of RJ limit the litigant’s persuasion opportunities by blocking the litigants’ 
opportunity to persuade the trial court to reverse an incorrect judgment. 
Claim preclusion presents the same problem, as it often shuts the door on a 
plaintiff who forgot to include a specific claim for remedy in his initial 
cause of action. In this case, the plaintiff is deprived of any persuasion 
opportunity. 
 
 114. Id. at 673. 
 115. Id. at 674. Furthermore, the authors stress that appeal could be, but is not, an opportunity for 
the comprehensive reconsideration of the case. Motions for extraordinary relief from judgments could 
serve a similar function, but they do not because they their scope is much more limited. See id. at 740-
95. 
 116.  Resnik, supra note 102, at 847. 
 117. Id. at 848. 
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An important constitutional value is that civil courts ensure access to 
judicial decisionmaking.118 Citizenship entails not only “access to the 
government decisionmakers but [also] the opportunity to participate in the 
shaping of government policy.”119 Owen Fiss argues that “courts exist to 
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.”120 Access and 
participation are not merely important, but, according to Leubsdorf, “they 
are constitutionally important,” and therefore “one should protect the rights 
of citizens to enter the courthouse and argue before the judges.”121 But one 
of the main obstacles that interferes with the constitutional civil procedure 
is “the doctrine of res judicata, which could be interpreted as barring the 
relitigation in federal court of a constitutional claim that was raised or 
might have been raised in a state court.”122 Leubsdorf believes that 
“[a]lthough the Court has embraced the broad application of res judicata to 
Civil Rights Act suits, it is not obliged to continue doing so.”123 
The requirement of due process is arguably limited to ensuring that 
. . . the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their 
positions on the issues in dispute . . . [and] given the costliness of 
relitigation, the same parties should not be allowed to present the same 
matter for resolution to a court again. One full and fair day in court is 
enough. There must be an end to litigation, even if the first judgment 
was actually erroneous.124 
But this “is a gross simplification,” 125 as Casad and Clermont, two 
leading scholars of RJ, explain when discussing the drawbacks of the 
traditional justification of RJ: 
In the first place, this explanation conflates issue preclusion, which 
reaches only matters actually litigated and determined, with claim 
preclusion, which blocks “relitigation” of matters never even litigated. 
In the second place, this explanation fails to predict the considerable 
complexity of res judicata doctrine, constructed as it is of fine rules 
and peppered as it is with fuzzy exceptions. In the third place, this 
explanation has managed to pervert res judicata on recent occasions, 
 
 118. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 591, 597-99 
(1984). 
 119. Id. at 597. 
 120. Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979). See also Scott, 
supra note 95. 
 121.  Leubsdorf, supra note 118, at 598. 
 122. Id. at 606. 
 123. Id. 
 124. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 30. 
 125. Id. 
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because its simplistic emphasis on judicial economy can blind courts to 
other relevant policies that would argue against expanding res 
judicata”126 
Thus, because RJ is a drastic measure, it should be applied only in 
clear cases when a matter has been specifically litigated and a litigant has 
had his actual day in court.127 It ought not to be extended to matters that 
could or should have been raised and litigated in the first action. 
3. The Effect of Claim Preclusion on the Conduct of Litigation 
 a. The Behavior Modification Model Perspective 
The rule of claim preclusion and the rule against splitting a single 
claim are considered by many as a fundamental contribution to the 
efficiency of judicial proceedings, as emphasized by Robert C. Casad: 
“Modern procedure seeks to maximize the efficiency of judicial proceeding 
by encouraging the presentation of all claims that can conveniently be tried 
together in the framework of a single law suit.”128 
This traditional approach assumes that an efficient judicial system 
should seek to include all actions and remedies in a single “claim.” 
Nevertheless, I argue that the rules of RJ, especially those of claim 
preclusion, are inconsistent with the behavior modification model because 
their impact on the conduct of litigation is in many cases negative and 
harmful. 
The rule of claim preclusion is often referred to as prohibiting the 
splitting of a cause of action.129 If plaintiffs fail to include any part of a 
demand or cause of action in the first action, they cannot bring another 
action to claim the omitted part after judgment has been pronounced, 
whether as an item of damage or a ground of recovery.130 In most common 
law systems, a plaintiff who obtains a judgment on a claim cannot initiate a 
second action on the same claim, although some exceptions to the general 
rule have been carved out in unusual circumstances.131 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. A similar approach was expressed by the English court in Ord v. Ord [1923] KB 432 at 439 
(Eng.). But further on, the court stated the traditional, broader definition of RJ. 
 128. CASAD, supra note 8, at 26. 
 129. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676. 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 685. 
 131. See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103; CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 85-106; 
BOWER, supra note 7, at 149-51, 378-80; LANGE, supra note 11, at 231-84. 
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Insisting on the inclusion of all distinct claims in one action has some 
disadvantages,132 for litigants may argue each point with greater intensity 
for fear of the future effects of RJ. The rule of claim preclusion forces 
plaintiffs to include all the claims and remedies that may be developed 
from one cause of action, significantly aggravating the dispute between the 
parties and forcing them to litigate their potential claims to the utmost.133 
What are the effects of the rule against splitting a single claim on the 
plaintiff’s incentives to sue? On the one hand, there is no doubt that 
without broad-scope claim preclusion the chance of endless litigation is 
greater, and therefore an argument can be made that, without claim 
preclusion, the plaintiff may have an incentive to sue the defendant again 
and again. On the other hand, splitting a cause of action may provide a 
strong incentive for a plaintiff to sue for all the potential claims and 
remedies that can be included in one cause of action. This is because the 
plaintiff knows that, if he or she fails to include any part of a demand or 
cause of action in the first action, the plaintiff cannot bring another action 
to claim the omitted part after judgment has been pronounced. 
At the same time, under a more flexible system that allows a cause of 
action to be split, the plaintiff can pursue his or her claims in stages using 
legitimate strategic considerations and is therefore not forced to press all 
claims to the utmost, as would be the case under the common law system. 
At a particular stage in the dispute, the plaintiff may be interested only in 
one claim or remedy but, because of claim preclusion, he or she is forced to 
sue for all potential claims and remedies. If the plaintiff were permitted to 
sue initially for only a portion of the remedies, without the risk of estoppel 
looming over the other remedies, later he or she may forgo the other 
remedies or these may become irrelevant with time. 
An Israeli Supreme Court judgment illustrates a typical case in which 
the strategic interest of the plaintiff is to not sue immediately for all the 
 
 132. In another article I challenged the traditional assumption that the rule against splitting a single 
claim/cause of action increases efficiency by introducing some economic and behavioral effects of the 
rule. See Yuval Sinai, The Downside of Preclusion: Some Behavioral and Economic Effects of Cause of 
Action Estoppel in Civil Actions, 56 MCGILL L. J. (forthcoming 2011). The article discusses the 
problematic incentives of litigating parties under the current Anglo-American rule of claim preclusion, 
and its harmful effects on the conduct and cost of litigation, and on the chance of reaching a settlement. 
Some of the aspects mentioned in brief in II.B.3 of the present article are further developed in The 
Downside of Preclusion. See also JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 687 (noting disadvantages). 
 133. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Examination Before and Behind the 'Entire Controversy' 
Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 8, 7 (1966); Robert A. Erichson, Of Horror Stories and Happy Endings: The 
Rise and the Fall of Preclusion-Based Compulsory Party Joinder Under the New Jersey Entire 
Controversy Doctrine, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 757 (1999). 
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remedies but to retain the option to sue for other remedies at a later date.134 
The Stefania Hotel case involved a breach of contract that obliged a 
company to purchase land and build a structure on it. The plaintiff wanted 
to split his claims so that in the first stage he could claim only 
enforcement/imposition, and at a later stage he could sue for other remedies 
such as compensation for the damages incurred because of the breach of 
contract. Justice Haim Herman Cohn stated 
[i]n this case we are dealing with a large and expensive object. It is 
possible that if the plaintiff wins and obtains an order to enforce the 
contract he accomplishes all his business objectives and will no longer 
be interested in compensation for damages because his damages could 
be repaid by his profits. If he lost and the court decided that the 
contract is not binding, he may decide to avoid spending more money 
on a second lawsuit for damages caused by the breach of the contract. 
And if the court dismissed the first lawsuit for enforcement although 
the contract was binding, there is no reason why he cannot sue later for 
compensation for damages.135 
In this case, the Israeli court legitimized the plaintiff’s strategic 
considerations.136 The plaintiff’s strategic considerations are also relevant 
when there has been a long relationship between the litigants as, for 
example, between a supplier and a large customer. In this type of situation, 
the damaged party is not likely to want to sue its business partner for all the 
remedies that may flow from one cause of action because it wants to 
continue the relationship. Instead, the party may want to claim one remedy 
and reserve the option to sue later for the other remedies. Applying claim 
preclusion in such cases would force the litigants into a broad legal 
battlefront that would probably damage their future relations, which is 
against the interests of the litigants and of the public. Indeed, the public 
interest and that of the litigants is best served by allowing the plaintiff to 
split the cause of action in such cases. The court should allow the plaintiff 
to split the cause of action in such cases ex ante (when requested by the 
plaintiff at the beginning of the proceedings) or even ex post (when it was 
not requested before). 
 
 134. In the non-religious Israeli law the common law broad-scope RJ concept usually applies. See 
HARNON, supra note 14. 
 135. CA 329/73 Stafania Hotel Ltd. v. Miller 28(1) PD 19, 20 [1980] (translated from Hebrew by 
the author). For a discussion of the effects of this theory on Israeli law, see Benjamin Rotenberg, 
Splitting Remedies, (Hebrew) 16 MISHPATIM 390, 397 (1987) (Isr.). 
 136. See ISR. R. CIV. P. 45 (1984) (stating that the legal basis of the decision is the court's authority 
to allow splitting the remedies flowing from one cause of action). 
SINAI_PROOF2 3/25/2011  1:53:37 PM 
2011] RECONSIDERING RES JUDICATA 375 
The theory of mediation illustrates how the process of determining 
which issues are included in a legal process—and in what order they are 
included—greatly affects outcomes.137 Many mediators recommend 
discussing the less problematic issues in the beginning and leaving the 
more emotional and intensely disputed issues for a later stage, or perhaps 
not addressing them at all.138 This settlement strategy helps establish a 
more congenial atmosphere in which the parties are more cooperative and 
have a greater chance of reaching a settlement. Therefore, the mediator 
steers the discussion toward those issues that are most likely to be relevant 
to finding a solution or a settlement.139 By contrast, the rules of claim 
preclusion act as major obstacles to achieving a desirable behavior 
modification model of litigation and to reaching a settlement.140 This does 
not mean, however, that the court should always allow claims to be split. As 
shown in Part IV.A.6 infra, in Jewish law the court should not permit the 
plaintiff to split his or her claims if the judge believes that the plaintiff is 
dishonest or that the plaintiff wants to harass the defendant one claim at a 
time in order to harm the defendant. This procedure makes sense because in 
such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason for splitting one cause of 
action, for the claim does not contribute to the behavior modification of 
litigation, which should be a major consideration in allowing a claim to be 
split. These considerations help explain the need for a more balanced 
model that would replace the contemporary broad-scope common law 
model of RJ. Limiting the scope of RJ would provide a balanced model 
between the interests of efficiency of judicial proceeding and the behavior 
modification of litigation. 
 
 137. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 67 (1994). 
See also Susan Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 1, 7 (1986). 
 138. For example, studies on divorce disputes show that mediators have a tendency not to discuss 
issues concerning intimate relations between spouses, such as trust and self-evaluation, although these 
issues have been raised by the parties. The mediators preferred to concentrate on factual issues, such as 
money, property, and child custody rather than dealing with the spouses' private relations. See BARUCH 
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 137, at 67 (citing WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, COMMUNICATION, MARITAL 
DISPUTE AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 160-64 (1991)). For another approach, see Silbey & Merry, supra 
note 137, at 16-17. 
 139. See James A. Wall & Dale E. Rude, Judicial Mediation: Techniques, Strategies and 
Situational Effects, 41 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 44, 53 (1985). 
 140. On the other hand, it may be argued that without RJ the litigants might pursue endless 
litigation rather than a settlement. But this argument is not so convincing, because, as mentioned above, 
the judge should have the authority to prevent the plaintiff from splitting claims when doing so does not 
contribute to a behavior modification model of litigation. For analyses of the effects of the rule against 
splitting a cause of action on the chances of reaching a settlement see Sinai, supra note 132. 
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 b. Economic Efficiency 
Many scholars are increasingly using economic models to analyze 
litigation outcomes.141 Indeed, the possibility that a given trial outcome has 
preclusive effects on future litigation significantly influences the outcome 
of negotiations142 and is relevant to the question of settlement extortion.143 
Some scholars argue in favor of broad-scope preclusion: 
If two trials would produce a large overlap of issues or evidence, it is 
wasteful to society and harassing to the adversary to have more than 
one trial. This will often be the case even when the evidence and issues 
are not identical. Consider the wastefulness of trying in separate 
actions the alternative theories of breach of express contract to pay for 
goods or services and breach of an implied undertaking to pay the 
reasonable value of the same items.144 
But, as illustrated above, insisting on including all factually distinct 
claims in one action has some disadvantages, some of which significantly 
affect cost efficiency for both the litigants and the courts. Preclusion is 
likely to force parties to litigate their potential claims to the utmost and thus 
increase the costs of litigation. But if the plaintiff were permitted to sue 
first for only a portion of the remedies without the risk of estoppel, suing 
for the other remedies might be unnecessary in the end. In the cases I 
described in the previous section, it is in the public’s interest to allow the 
plaintiff to split the cause of action in order to maximize the efficient 
operation of the courts and to reduce costs for both the litigating parties and 
for the courts. Claim preclusion is also likely to cause parties to include 
possible claims that they may be unwilling to forgo but also hesitant to 
press,145 which can also result in increased costs of litigation. Casad and 
Clermont clarified this issue as follows: 
The simplistic approach is to assume that res judicata, at least if 
effortlessly applied, always saves costs by foreclosing additional 
 
 141. It has been noted that none of the models so far incorporate the effects of preclusion. Note, 
Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1940, 1942-43, n.17 (1992) [hereinafter Exposing the Extortion Gap]. See also, Steven Shavell, 
Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of 
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under 
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984). 
 142. See, e.g., Exposing the Extortion Gap, supra note 141, at 1953-55. 
 143. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 
437 (1988). 
 144. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 686-87. See also VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103. For efficiency 
factors favoring preclusion, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 31-33. 
 145. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 687. 
SINAI_PROOF2 3/25/2011  1:53:37 PM 
2011] RECONSIDERING RES JUDICATA 377 
litigation. But a moment’s thought reveals countervailing effects. A 
broad rule of claim preclusion will encourage a claimant to put 
everything before the first court, while a narrower rule might result in 
unasserted matters never having to be litigated at all. A broad rule of 
issue preclusion, which establishes an outcome for all purposes in all 
contexts for all times, may produce litigation to the death over that 
issue in the initial action. Obviously, every res judicata problem 
requires the weighting of net savings: adding up the savings of avoided 
later litigation, but subtracting the costs of fighting over res judicata’s 
application and also the costs of intensified initial litigation.146 
Furthermore, the traditional view that “it is wasteful to society and 
harassing to the adversary to have more than one trial,”147 and similar 
justifications of RJ address this rule from an ex post point of view, without 
considering the effects of the rules on the parties’ potential incentives 
before a dispute has even been filed. Some scholars argue that procedural 
rules are often examined from a narrow perspective, focusing on the effect 
of the rules ex post.148 In an effort to strike a proper balance between justice 
and efficiency, courts tend to ignore the ex ante effects of procedural rules 
before their actual application. The ex ante examination of legal rules is a 
fundamental concept of the economic approach to the analysis of law, 
designed to give jurists an insight into the effects of legal rules on the 
behavior of the parties.149 
Ex ante analysis of the rules of cause of action/issue preclusion reveals 
the effect of these rules on the trial costs of the parties.150 It appears that the 
broader the scope of the claim preclusion, the higher the costs of a 
particular procedure. First, under broad-scope claim preclusion, it is 
necessary to claim all remedies in one cause of action to prevent their 
estoppel in the future. Second, it is necessary to expend much greater effort 
on each cause of action because the consequences of the decision have far-
reaching effects on future action. 
These observations lead to the conclusion that, under broad-scope 
claim preclusion, fewer claims are submitted to the court but the costs of 
 
 146. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 34. 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 148. Alon Klement & Roy Shapira, Justice and Efficiency in Civil Procedure—A Novel Interpretive 
Approach, 7 LAW & BUS. 75 (2007) (Isr.). 
 149. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVEL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004): 
Under the economic approach to the analysis of law, two basic types of questions about legal 
rules are addressed. The first type is descriptive, concerning the effects of legal rule . . . . 
Given the characterization of individuals' behavior as rational, the influence of legal rules on 
behavior can be ascertained. 
 150. Klement & Shapira, supra note 148, at 102. For an analysis of the influences of issue 
preclusion, see Exposing the Extortion Gap, supra note 141. 
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every claim is much higher than that of an average claim under a narrow RJ 
policy, which can have an adverse effect on access to judicial 
decisionmaking.151 Ex ante considerations of broad-scope claim preclusion 
can prevent plaintiffs from submitting their claims to court because of the 
need to claim all remedies in one cause of action, which could increase trial 
costs to a level that may prevent them from submitting their claims at all. 
C. Correctness and Revisionism 
1. The Importance of Preventing Erroneous Decisions 
There is a tension between finality and revisionism.152 Finality is an 
expression of the desire to achieve an end. The motivation for revising 
decisions, as suggested by Resnik, includes “the hopes of correcting error; 
of altering outcomes based upon changed circumstances; of imbuing some 
decisions with more meaning by having them made repeatedly and 
sometimes by prestigious actors; of giving individuals a sense of having 
been fully and fairly heard.”153 
Error correction is one reason for revision, although a series of 
justifications have been offered for preferring the views of a second 
decisionmaker to those of the trial judge.154 Kenneth Scott discussed the 
separate implications of the two models discussed above for appeals and 
due process.155 Scott analyzed the proposition that the right of appealing a 
court ruling is never constitutionally guaranteed or essential for the conflict 
resolution model:156 
In terms of a mechanism for settling disputes, one hearing is enough to 
do the job, and it is all that arbitration and grievance procedures 
customarily afford. No doubt the loser would like another chance, but 
that is endlessly true. Rather than the outcome, it is the existence of a 
form of impartial arbitrament that is essential.157 
Nevertheless, when assessing the issue of appeals from the point of 
view of the behavior modification model, the effects of error are a concern 
 
 151. The discussion, supra Part II.B.2, focused on the ex post effects of broad-scope claim 
preclusion on the constitutional right to access to judicial decisionmaking—the prohibition of initiating 
further claims on behalf of the first cause of action. The above analysis draws attention to a more 
harmful effect on the access to judicial decisionmaking. 
 152. Resnik, supra note 102, at 854-55. 
 153. Id. at 855. 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 855-57; Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); Scott, supra note 95, at 945-47. 
 155. Scott, supra note 95, at 945. 
 156. Id. at 946. 
 157. Id. 
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because this model proposes to affect behavior by imposing costs 
correctly.158 The function of the appeal is primarily to reduce the incidence 
of legal errors.159 According to Scott, the behavior modification model 
proposes “that a discretionary channel of review be open for cases where 
the costs of legal error are high. Such a position explicitly reorganizes the 
lawmaking function of appellate courts and would require as a matter of 
due process that they be given the discretion to grant review in order to 
prevent the erroneous imposition of substantial costs or penalties.”160 
Indeed, applying RJ rules that prevent a trial-level tribunal from 
reconsidering its decisions does not help prevent erroneous decisions and is 
therefore not desirable from the perspective of the behavior modification 
model. As Casad and Clermont noted, RJ is not an end in itself but merely 
plays a role in a larger system of justice.161 Some major fairness factors 
weigh against the rules of RJ, among them “the fair-outcome value of 
deciding on the merits rather than on technicalities and of refusing to 
curtail society’s search for truth.”162 
2. Producing an Efficient Judicial Process of Error Correction 
 a. The Error Costs of Not Seeking Truth 
From the perspective of cost efficiency, as well, some factors weigh 
against the rule of preclusion, including “the error costs of not seeking truth 
by reaching the merits and trying to correct any initial mistake,”163 as 
explained by Casad and Clermont: 
Because legal rules have goals—be they the maximization of economic 
value or other substantive goals—and because realization of modern 
goals requires accurate application of the law to the facts, mistakes by 
the judicial branch distance society from those goals. Judicial mistakes 
thus impose social costs, and the procedural system should strive to 
reduce those costs. Procedure should frown on any impediment to 
correcting mistake.164 
Some scholars have argued, however, that the presence of errors in a 
prior judgment is irrelevant to RJ.165 A typical economic analysis of RJ is 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 947. 
 160. Id. 
 161. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 33. 
 162. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 163. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). 
 164.  Id. 
 165. Id. 
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presented by Judge Richard Posner, who justifies the doctrine in modern 
economic terms.166 According to Posner, there is less justification for RJ 
“than there would be for a direct limitation on the amount that parties might 
spend on a law suit. The first loss should discourage the plaintiff from 
expending additional resources in trying to vindicate his claim; legal 
prohibition seems largely superfluous.”167 But, in the end, Posner finds an 
economic justification for RJ because of the direct costs incurred by the 
legal system if the court is to address the same matter again. Posner argues 
that, because a second round of litigation is unlikely to be more accurate, 
re-adjudication will not avoid error costs; that is, the costs caused to social 
goal maximization by mistaken outcomes. Given the increased direct costs 
of relitigation on the one hand and neutral error costs on the other, 
proponents of economic efficiency in the law should generally favor RJ. 
Nevertheless, I agree with Casad and Clermont that “although 
commentators frequently observe that the existence of error in the prior 
judgment is irrelevant to res judicata, this is not really true.”168 The authors 
argue further that “it is certainly not true that error is irrelevant to the 
formulation of res judicata. In shaping the rules and exceptions of res 
judicata law, the lawmakers must remain aware that the possibility of error 
is relevant to efficiency, as well as fairness.”169  
 b. Providing Information about the Occurrence of Error 
Arguing in favor of RJ, Posner asks why we assume that re-
adjudication by the trial judge or by another tribunal will be more accurate 
than adjudication by the first tribunal. The relevance of this question 
extends beyond the rules of RJ, and a similar question is frequently asked 
about the appeals process: why do we assume that the decision of the 
appeals court is more correct than that of the trial judge? 
The answer to the last question, in my opinion, should lead to a search 
for an appropriate explanation of the general need to re-adjudicate and 
should lead to a position that favors non-preclusion. A persuasive 
explanation of the appeals process of error correction was provided by 
Steven Shavell, who suggested that, if litigants possessed information that 
errors had been made, and if the appeals courts could frequently verify the 
information, litigants might file appeals only when errors were likely to 
 
 166. See Posner, supra note 51, at 444-45. 
 167. Id. at 445. 
 168. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 34. 
 169. Id. 
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have been made but not otherwise.170 In Shavell’s opinion, under these 
circumstances, the appeals process could achieve error correction at low 
cost because the legal system would be burdened with reconsidering only 
in the subset of cases in which errors were more likely to have been made. 
In other words, the appeals process might enable society to take advantage 
of information that litigants have about erroneous decisions and thereby 
reduce the incidence of mistakes at a low cost.171 
What causes errors in the court, and why are they not corrected at the 
trial but rather in the appeals court? These questions are more poignant in 
the case of clear mistakes made by the trial court. One of the explanations, 
given by Shavell, is as follows: 
Although it is true that when courts do make fairly clear mistakes, 
these will often be pointed out by litigants at trial and corrected there, 
that will not always be the outcome. On the one hand, a litigant may 
not have a chance to assert an error at trial: the error may be made in 
the court’s decision itself—when it is too late to make an objection. On 
the other hand, an error that is asserted at trial may not be corrected 
there despite the fact that it would be seen on reflection as a clear 
mistake; to appreciate that an error has occurred may require 
deliberation that the press of trial does not allow. After trial, however, 
the losing litigant has both the time and a strong incentive to review his 
objections to single out those with merit.172 Observe as well that the 
post-trial opportunity of litigants to inspect the record provides us a 
reason why litigants may discover trial court errors even though their 
general legal expertise may be inferior to the courts.173 
In my opinion, these observations support a non-preclusion approach 
because granting the parties the option to relitigate in the trial court can 
contribute significantly to the process of error correction. Relitigation in the 
trial court can allow litigants to take advantage of information that they 
gain about erroneous decisions, reducing the incidence of mistakes at an 
even lower cost than that of error correction by the appellate court. Unlike 
the appellate judge, who learns the factual and legal grounds of the case on 
appeal, the trial judge is familiar with the details of the case, and the only 
 
 170. Shavell, supra note 154, at 381. Shavell also notes that this outcome may be fostered by 
charging a fee for bringing an appeal to discourage appeals when decisions are likely to have been 
correct. 
 171. Id. at 382. 
 172. “Note that during the trial, before knowing the outcome, the litigant's incentive to discover 
errors is lower.” Id. at 414, n.57. 
 173. Id. at 414. According to another explanation, "one presumes that trial courts will occasionally 
make even fairly clear mistakes owing to a variety of factors: the inexperience of some judges, the 
pressure of time, and the fact that the courts are responsible for applying a vast body of law." Id. 
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new information introduced would be new evidence or the litigant’s 
argument that the judge’s decision was incorrect. After trial, the defeated 
litigant has both the time and the incentive to review his objections to the 
trial court decision. At this stage it could be efficient to introduce these 
objections to the trial judge (often this is the first time the judge is notified 
that he or she may have made a mistake) and give him or her the 
opportunity to reconsider his initial decision. If the trial judge were 
persuaded by the objections he or she could reverse the original decision 
and issue a new and hopefully more correct one. 
The probability that a second, revised decision by the trial judge 
would be more correct than the first one is often higher than the probability 
that the decision given by the appellate court is more correct than the initial 
decision. Judges—and people in general—do not easily admit that they 
have made an incorrect decision. Therefore, if the trial judge reaches the 
conclusion that he or she should reverse a decision, there is a good chance 
that his or her revised decision is more accurate than the first one.174 This 
assumption does not apply to appellate judges, who were not involved in 
the initial process, and therefore the probability that their decision will be 
more correct than the initial one is lower than the probability of the trial 
judge rendering a more correct decision. 
 c. Judicial Incentive to Avoid Reversal 
Another consideration that supports giving the trial judge the option of 
reconsidering his decision has to do with the judges’ incentives to avoid 
reversal of their decisions. One of the justifications for the appellate 
process is its effect on errors made at trial because of trial judges’ fear of 
reversal.175 Judges fear reversal because it may affect their reputation, their 
salaries, or the likelihood of promotion.176 Therefore, the appeals process 
can lead indirectly to increased trial court accuracy by encouraging judges 
to expend greater effort at trial. In this case, error prevention occurs 
without a formal appeal, during the initial trial, when litigants raise 
 
 174. At the same time, it is possible to argue that the trial judge is not likely to admit that he made a 
mistake, unlike the appellate judge who often finds the mistakes of the trial court. But this argument is 
not always true because the trial judge has a strong incentive to avoid reversal, which encourages him to 
render accurate decisions that will not be reversed on appeal. 
 175. SHAVELL, supra note 154, at 390-91. 
 176. Many articles address the incentives of judges. See, e.g., Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, 
Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and 
Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1983); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical 
Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992); Richard A. Posner, What Do 
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 
(1993). 
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objections to what they see as mistakes, in what Shavell calls “a system of 
appeal in the small.”177 
A non-preclusion legal system that permits the trial judge to 
reconsider his or her decision after the trial and to revise it if he or she finds 
the first decision to be incorrect can enhance significantly the likelihood 
that the trial judge will render accurate decisions. It is likely that the trial 
judge would use the opportunity to correct his or her mistakes after the trial 
to prevent an undesirable reversal—from his or her point of view—by the 
appellate court. And, if the error is not corrected by the trial judge, the error 
may still be corrected by the appellate court. 
 d. The Distinction between Law and Facts 
The U.S. legal system, like other common law legal systems,178 
distinguishes between law and facts in separating issues that can be 
appealed from those that cannot.179 In general, an appeal can be lodged on 
the grounds of error of law or error in applying the law to the facts. But 
ordinarily, an appeal cannot be lodged on the grounds that the discovered 
facts are incorrect, with some notable exceptions. 
According to Shavell’s rationale for the distinction between law and 
facts, when an error concerns rules and their application, 
it is possible in the ideal both for a litigant to recognize the error and 
for an appeals court to verify its occurrence . . . . By contrast to a claim 
that a rule was violated or misapplied, a claim that the found facts are 
themselves incorrect would often be difficult for an appeals court to 
corroborate, even though a litigant might know that the found facts 
were in error . . . . How could an appeals court confirm a claim by the 
defendant that the testimony is false? . . . For an appeals court to assess 
the validity of the witness’s testimony, the appeals court would often 
have to engage in costly reexamination of the trial court record and 
perhaps hear live testimony. . . .180 
But if cases are relitigated in the trial courts (as in Jewish law), factual 
issues can be reconsidered economically in the trial court because this court 
has already examined the main factual aspects of the case and, unlike the 
appellate court, the trial court does not need to learn all the details of the 
case to reconsider its initial decision. 
 
 177. SHAVELL, supra note 154, at 426. 
 178. For restrictions on the scope of appeal in the English legal system, see, for example, 
ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 492-98. 
 179. The scope of the appellate review is discussed by JAMES, supra note 2, at 766-75. 
 180. Shavell, supra note 154, at 418-19. 
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III. SECOND MODEL: NARROW-SCOPE RES JUDICATA 
The German–Continental civil-law system181 demonstrates an 
interesting and narrower version of RJ. In this part, I argue that, although 
the German model appears to be superior to the broader common law rules 
of RJ, its cost efficiency is questionable. 
A. Overview of the German–Continental Rules of RJ 
The German model of RJ182 is in many regards similar to the doctrine 
of RJ in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but “the scope and effect of the 
doctrine are somewhat different.”183 In the German civil system, only a 
judgment that is not “subject to further appeal (formelle Rechtskraft) stands 
as the conclusive adjudication” and is subject to RJ.184 The rationale for this 
system is simple. Wherever there is a multilevel apparatus of justice, as in 
the continental system in general185 and the German civil justice system in 
particular,186 original decisions can be treated as tentative and decision 
stability is needed only after the highest authority has spoken.187According 
to one interpretation of the German doctrine, the goal of RJ is to “guarantee 
certainty in litigation and to preclude repeated relitigation of matters 
already litigated and decided.”188 
In addition, “German civil procedure does not recognize the concept 
of claim preclusion in the broad sense as is the case in common law 
countries.”189 The basic rule is that a judgment binds the parties with 
respect to the subject matter of claims actually asserted and decided, but 
parties are not bound in actual or potential claims not submitted for 
adjudication.190 The concept of claim preclusion in the broader Anglo-
American version does not apply in German civil procedure, for the 
 
 181. I prefer to focus on Germany rather than other civil law systems because many jurists value 
this legal system and consider it a fine representative of the European–Continental system of civil 
procedure, valued more highly than the U.S. common law civil procedure. See e.g., John H. Langbein, 
The German Advantage In Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985). See also Benjamin Kaplan, 
Arthur T. von Mehren, & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
1443, 1443-72 (1958). 
 182. For the German rules of RJ, see PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 
355-66 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 355 n.245. 
 184. Id. at 355-56. 
 185. See DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 28-39. 
 186. For the German appellate justice, see MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 367-418. 
 187. DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 145. 
 188. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 355. 
 189. Id. at 357. 
 190. Id. 
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binding effect extends only to claims that could have been raised or might 
have arisen from the same occurrence.191 Whenever the issue of RJ is 
raised, the court examines and compares formal claims for relief and 
factual elements of the current claim with those of the decided case, and the 
new case will not be dismissed if the court finds a difference in the 
operative facts.192 
In Part II, I argued for the desirability of narrow-scope RJ. In this 
sense, the German model of RJ is superior to the common law model, but it 
poses some difficulties from the perspective of cost-efficiency, as discussed 
below. 
The narrow concept of RJ in the German system can be explained in 
light of one of the main features of the Continental legal process: the 
implementation of government policy. According to Damaska, in a legal 
process designed to implement government policy, such as in Continental 
or socialist/communist jurisdictions,193 the need to apply a doctrine of RJ is 
not great194 because the stability of judgments is a matter of low priority 
and because all judgments are rendered provisionally. In these jurisdictions, 
“it is difficult to justify any obstacle to reversal and reconsideration” of 
errors in judgment, both factual and legal.195 Nevertheless, Damaska 
stressed that “even the most energetic activist governments discover at 
some point that some stability and repose is needed . . . . Limited 
concessions to stability are made, and in their wake, some degree of 
decisional rigidity—a form of res judicata—emerges.”196 
Another aspect of the Continental concept of RJ concerns the initiator 
of an RJ claim. We have seen that, in the common law approach, the court 
does not acknowledge the doctrine of RJ on its own initiative.197 By 
contrast, the idea that RJ primarily concerns the public interest has 
prompted many Continental countries to adopt an absolute principle of RJ, 
requiring the court to take into account a former judgment on its own 
initiative. In several European countries, explicit statutory provisions can 
be found to this effect.198 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 358. 
 193. In Soviet legal systems the revision of judgments was not limited for a long period. 
DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 179. 
 194. Id. at 178-79. 
 195. Id. at 178. 
 196. Id. at 179. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. 
 198. Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and Anglo-
American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1940); see also MAURO CAPPELLETI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 254-55 (1965). 
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B. Inefficient Judicial Process of Error Correction 
 Despite the desirable narrow scope of its RJ rules, the German 
process of error correction is not efficient. German civil justice “has 
traditionally offered numerous appellate remedies . . . to parties aggrieved 
by judicial findings . . . at almost any stage of the proceedings.” In almost 
every case appellants have at least two potential levels of resort beyond the 
first-instance local court or state district court proceeding.199 
 A party dissatisfied with the decision of a court of first instance is 
generally entitled to trial de novo in the court of second instance. Only the 
third court to consider a civil case would defer to the prior decision.200 The 
“hierarchical” process reflects characteristics rooted in the Continental 
tradition,201 as explained by Damaska: “Once a lower official has spoken, 
the procedural episode conducted before him comes to an end (functum 
officio): corrections of his decision, if needed, can now be made only by 
higher-ups in the organization. Requests to reconsider addressed to the 
initial adjudicator are therefore misplaced.”202 Even if new evidence is 
discovered while an appeal is pending, the evidence must be submitted to 
the reviewing authority rather than to the original adjudicator.203 
These features of the Continental and German appellate processes 
produce inefficient error correction. Indeed, some reform proposals in 
Germany are “designed to reduce the appellate process and its consequent 
costs and delays.”204 But the reforms in appellate procedure enacted in July 
2001 were relatively modest and did not seriously abbreviate or curtail 
appellate options in most civil cases.205 
By contrast, a jurisdiction that allows the trial judge to reconsider and 
revise his or her decision if needed contributes significantly to an efficient 
judicial process of error correction. But German civil procedure, similar to 
that in other Continental legal systems, does not provide for a meaningful 
process of relitigation by the trial court. Only in rare cases does German 
civil procedure provide for special proceedings where a court may reopen 
its own civil judgment after all the appellate measures have been 
exhausted.206 The grounds for reopening are described by Murray and 
 
 199. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 367. 
 200. For the German appellate system, see generally id. at 367-417. 
 201. The coordinate style also reflects “features of the legal process in the English tradition,” as 
explained by DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 47. 
 202. Id. at 49. 
 203. Id. 
 204. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 369. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally id. at 362-65. 
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Stürner as a “particularly serious lack of correct procedure” or an “obvious 
disintegration of the correctness of the judgments.”207 These grounds are 
too narrow. From the perspective of cost efficiency, granting the parties 
broader options of relitigation in the trial court would be more appropriate 
and would contribute significantly to the process of error correction. 
IV. THIRD MODEL: NON-FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS 
A. Overview of the Jewish Law Model 
1. Rejection of the Doctrine of RJ 
Jewish law208 rejects many—but not all—of the elements of RJ and 
adopts an entirely different approach.209 By its nature, in which discovery 
of the truth is an element of justice to which all else is subordinated, Jewish 
law cannot accept an approach whereby a judgment is irreversible even 
when incorrect.210 Jewish law uses a unique concept of non-finality of 
judgments.211 In principle, a litigant can usually reverse a judicial decision 
after the judgment has been handed down. Judgments can be reopened for 
reconsideration based on an error in the judgment or on newly discovered 
evidence. Nevertheless, judgments are considered binding unless they are 
reversed by the trial court or an appellate tribunal.212 Rabbinical sources 
 
 207. Id. at 362. 
 208. For a general overview of some of the relevant sources in Jewish Law, see generally NAHUM 
RAKOVER, THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW (1994) and 3 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, 
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (1994). In general, “the principles and rules of Jewish law are based on the 
Scripture.” RAKOVER, supra, at 15. Some rules are mentioned quite explicitly, but others are only 
implied. All are elucidated in the teachings of the Tanna’im and Amora’im—the rabbis of the Mishnah 
and Talmud—and presented systematically in the codes. “The Mishnah is the first topical compilation 
of the Oral Law (Torah shebe’al peh) . . . completed around 200 C.E.” Id. at 33. “For some 300 years—
approximately 200-500 C.E—after the redaction of the Mishnah, Jewish scholarship was devoted 
primarily to the study, clarification, and application of the Mishnah.” Id. at 43. The scholars of this 
period, known as the Amora’im, wrote the Talmud. “Halakhic literature after the period of the Talmud 
includes . . . codes, halakhic glosses, response literature, and court decisions.” Id. at 61. The main codes 
are the Maimonides code Mishneh Torah (1135-1204), Tur (1270-1340), and Shulhan Arukh (1488-
1575), which are universally accepted as the authoritative code of Jewish law. Thus, over many 
generations, a comprehensive legal system has developed based on the Scripture as elaborated by 
exegesis and amplification. 
 209. A preference for this approach over that of English law is found in an opinion by Israeli 
Supreme Court Justice Berenson, in which he states that “it would be preferable to make recourse to 
this rule [SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20] that is better suited to the conditions in Israel than to 
be loyal to the severe, rigid English rule.” CA 395/60 Amrani v. Attorney General, 15 PD 594, 602 
(1960). 
 210. See Chigier, supra note 19, at 129-30; ELIAV SHOCHETMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JEWISH 
LAW 423-41 (1988). 
 211. See generally SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210. 
 212. See id. at 441. 
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indicate that, if the court acquits the defendant in a suit and the plaintiff 
lodges a claim against the defendant in another court, the defendant need 
not litigate or answer the plaintiff’s complaint in the second court; in 
addition, the second court is not permitted to hear the plaintiff because the 
defendant has already been acquitted by the first court.213 Thus, some RJ-
like principles can be found in Jewish law, but this role is minimal. In the 
Jewish legal system, a judgment is in principle subject to revision,214 
normally by the court that issued it. Courts revise judgments if new 
evidence comes to light undermining the facts on which the judgment was 
based, provided that the party seeking to adduce the new evidence is not 
debarred from so doing.215 Judgments are also subject to revision for errors 
in the application of the law, as discussed in Part IV.4 infra. 
2. Contemporary Application in Rabbinical Courts in the State of 
Israel 
The ancient Jewish law concept of non-finality of judgments also 
applies in the contemporary system of Israeli rabbinical courts authorized 
in the modern State of Israel, which is a rather unusual legal system. In 
Israel, alongside the regular civil courts operates a separate system of 
religious courts that adjudicate matters of personal status involving 
members of the religious communities.216 For Jews in Israel, matters of 
marriage and divorce are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical 
courts, which rule according to Jewish family law.217 The procedural rules 
of the rabbinical courts, which also deal with the issue of RJ, are somewhat 
modern in form. The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure for the 
rabbinical courts in the State of Israel marked the first attempt in the history 
of Jewish law to provide a modern compilation of the rules of procedure. In 
1943, the Council of the Chief Rabbinate published the Rules of Procedure, 
based largely on the Jewish law classic literature.218 The rules have been 
 
 213. See The RESPONSA at the end of HAZEH HATNUFAH, § 40, as mentioned in BEIT YOSEF, 
Hoshen Mishpat, § 12, and also accepted by RAMA in DARCHEI MOSHE, Hoshen Mishpat, 20:2. 
 214. See Cohn & Sinai, supra note 18, at 437-38, 445. 
 215. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 3:8; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1. 
 216.  See, e.g., Menashe Shava, The Rabbinical Courts in Israel: Jurisdiction Over Non-Jews?, 27 
J. CHURCH & ST. 99 (1985), reprinted in MENASHE SHAVA, SELECTED TOPICS IN FAMILY AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2000). 
 217. Section 1 of the RABBINICAL COURTS JURISDICTION (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE) LAW OF 
1953, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1952-1953), reads as follows: “Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in 
Israel, being nationals or residents of the state, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Rabbinical 
Courts,” which rule according to the Jewish family law. Many Jews in the Diaspora voluntarily avail 
themselves of the services of private rabbinical courts. 
 218. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 11-12. 
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revised several times over the years. The last revision was in 1993, and all 
references in the present article are to those rules. 
The modern rules of procedure for the rabbinical courts provide for an 
option to reverse a judgment.219 
3. Dilemma Between the Truth and Ending the Dispute 
Jewish law has always taken into account the difficulty in allowing 
endless litigation between the same parties and the dilemma created by the 
conflicting policies: justice and efficiency.220 On the one hand, justice 
demands that a case be reconsidered when the losing party claims to have 
new evidence establishing the truth. On the other hand, a legal system 
cannot allow a dispute to continue indefinitely. The Mishnah (the first 
topical compilation of the oral law, completed around 200 C.E.) records 
two diverging opinions of sages that reflect the tension between the two 
opposing policies.221 The major principle mentioned in the beginning of the 
Mishnah states that “[a]ny time a party can produce any proof, the court 
may reverse the verdict.” This statement rejects the doctrine of RJ entirely. 
But a limitation follows: “If the court said to him to bring all the evidence 
within thirty days, and he brought it after thirty days, the verdict may not 
be reversed.” 
According to this opinion, a dispute can end by setting a time limit for 
producing new evidence, after which time the verdict cannot be reversed. 
But this opinion was forcefully rejected by Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel, the 
President of the Sanhedrin, who demanded that justice be done: “What 
should he do when he did not find the evidence within thirty days but found 
it afterwards?” 
According to Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel’s approach, when a conflict 
between the public interest of finality of judgments and the commitment of 
rendering a true judgment based on true facts arises, the latter policy 
prevails. This strong argument against injustice was accepted by the Jewish 
law codifiers, and the 30-day limitation was withdrawn.222 But the halakhic 
codifiers accepted another limitation. If a court asks a litigant whether he or 
she has other witnesses or evidence, and the litigant replies that he or she 
has no more witnesses or evidence, the litigant is not permitted to bring 
 
 219. See id. at 432-33. Chapter 14 of these rules contains the procedure for reversing a judgment 
and reconsidering a case. 
 220. Chigier, supra note 19, at 129. 
 221. See MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 3:8. Quotations that follws refer to the Sanhedrin unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 222. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1. 
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them later to reverse the judgment.223 Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel objected 
to this limitation as well, but the majority decided against him,224 realizing 
that sooner or later every dispute must be stopped somehow. Nevertheless, 
the majority could not ignore the demand for justice, and they permitted 
litigants to present new evidence in some cases, even after the litigants had 
stated that they had no more witnesses or evidence, because the court found 
that they did not lie.225 Note that these rules apply both to the plaintiff and 
the defendant.226 
The rules accepted by the Jewish codifiers indicate that the right to 
revise a judgment is not time-limited.227 This approach was adopted in the 
modern procedural rules of the Israeli rabbinical courts. According to 
Section One of Rule 129, a litigant has the right—at any time—to request 
that the court that adjudicated his or her case reconsider it. This rule, which 
does not set a deadline, is problematic, and it certainly does not contribute 
to the parties’ sense of security or to the legal system’s stability, for the 
possibility of endless litigation is always present. This problem can be 
solved, however, by adopting the minority opinion listed in the Jerusalem 
Talmud, whereby the right to request that the trial court reconsider a case 
has a deadline: the actual execution of the judgment by the parties.228 In 
other words, the trial court may reconsider a case before the judgment has 
been carried out, but not after, as, for example, after one party has paid the 
other according to the judgment because this is the final stage of fulfillment 
of the judgment.229 At this stage, the party that received the money is 
already counting on it; if the other party were allowed to reopen the case, it 
could damage the party that received the money. Although this opinion, 
which contains some elements of the RJ concept, was not accepted by the 
mainstream of Jewish law codifiers,230 Jewish law could in principle 
 
 223. See MISHNAH, supra note 215, as accepted in SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1. 
 224. Id. 
 225. This is because when he said he has no further proof he could not have known that other 
evidence existed, as for example when witnesses arrived from overseas after the trial, or if it has been 
proven that the briefcase in which he kept the documents was not in his possession at the time of the 
trial, etc. 
 226. See Chigier, supra note 19, at 131. The author noted that there may be good reason for 
differentiating between the two litigants. The sense of justice in the case of the defendant is stronger 
than in the case of the plaintiff, because it is the plaintiff's fault that he filed suit before ascertaining that 
he had all the evidence. Furthermore, as it regards the plaintiff the doctrine of RJ may be applied for the 
sake of public policy, but as it regards the defendant, it is to prevent his being harassed repeatedly by 
the plaintiff. This distinction was not accepted by the halakhic codifiers, as noted above. 
 227. See SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 222. 
 228. See JERUSALEM TALMUD, Sanhedrin 3:12. 
 229. See RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK, BEHER ELIYAHU, § 20. 
 230. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
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recognize a clear new law (which does not exist in the contemporary 
practice) that set a time limit (for example, two or three years) on the right 
to request that the trial court reconsider a case, if such legislation were 
enacted by the rabbinical authorities.231 
4. New Evidence and New Factual and Legal Arguments 
As we have seen, a rabbinical trial court may reconsider its judgment 
if a litigant presents sufficiently probative evidence that was found after the 
judgment was made. In order to challenge the decision, the petitioner must 
show that the new evidence was not in his possession during the trial and 
that he was unaware of its existence.232 This limitation was adopted by the 
modern procedural rules of the Israeli rabbinical courts. Section One of 
Rule 129 indicates that the litigant has the right at all times to request the 
court that adjudicated his case to reconsider the case based on a new factual 
argument or new evidence of which he was unaware during the original 
trial. The litigant must specify in his request the details of the new 
evidentiary or factual arguments he wishes to present in order to reverse the 
judgment.233 The litigant must also explain why he did not present the 
evidence at the original trial.234 The rabbinical court considers the request 
without hearing the parties235 and may reject the request or invite the 
parties for a hearing. If the court decides to hear the claim, the court can 
delay enforcement of its judgment236 until it renders a final decision on the 
request for reversal.237 
These rules are related to another rule stating that after all claims and 
evidence have been presented at the trial, the court should ask the parties 
whether they have additional claims and evidence.238 According to this 
rule, if the parties declare that they have no further evidence or claims, the 
court will not accept further evidence or claims in the future unless the 
litigant provides a good explanation for his request. Indeed, the evidentiary 
stage of the trial ends only after the parties clearly answer the court’s 
question and their declarations are recorded in the trial protocol.239 Note 
 
 231. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 430. 
 232. See RESPONSA ROSH, 13:20. Relying on sources in Jewish law, Israeli Supreme Court Justice 
Kister held that new evidence cannot be introduced after a decision has been rendered if it could have 
been brought earlier. CA 211/65 Attorney General v. Mazan, 19 PD 32, 43-44 [1965] (Isr.). 
 233. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 129, § 2. See also SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 432. 
 234.  Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 129 § 2. 
 235. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 130 § 1. 
 236. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 130 § 2. 
 237. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 131. 
 238. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 72. 
 239. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 432 n.49. 
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that in practice, as a result of this rule, the Israeli rabbinical courts are 
asked to reverse few judgments, and a litigant who declares during the trial 
that he has no further evidence cannot present additional evidence later.240 
There is a difference of opinion as to whether a party can challenge a 
decision on the basis of new legal arguments that were not raised at trial.241 
According to one view, a decision can be challenged only on the basis of 
new evidence;242 however, the prevailing view appears to be that a decision 
can be challenged on the basis of new legal arguments as well.243 
5. Appellate Tribunals and the Right to Reverse Erroneous Judgments 
Most modern legal systems contain several hierarchically organized 
judicial tribunals. A litigant who is dissatisfied with a lower tribunal’s 
decision can appeal the decision to a higher tribunal. The right of appeal is 
based on the presumption that the lower tribunal may have erred in its 
ruling. The aspiration for true justice requires (both in common law and 
German–Continental systems) that the litigant be given an additional 
opportunity to have his or her claims heard. By contrast, in traditional 
Jewish law, the availability of an appellate tribunal is not self-evident.244 
Admittedly, a rabbinical court that has erred is obligated to reexamine its 
decision and correct it,245 and the litigant is entitled to return to the trial 
court after receiving its decision and attempt to convince it that a mistake 
has been made.246 “[T]his is clearly not a satisfactory solution,”247 and in 
many cases the rabbinical court disagrees that its decision was mistaken, a 
position that some litigants ascribe, “rightly or wrongly, to the 
stubbornness on the part of [judges] who are unwilling to amend their 
rulings.”248 
The establishment of rabbinical appellate tribunals in Israel in the 
twentieth century is “the result of extrinsic circumstances, such as 
competition with external judicial institutions.”249 The most prominent and 
 
 240. See id. at 433 n.52. 
 241. See id. at 436-67. 
 242. Sho'el ve-Nish'al le-Rabbi Khalfon Moshe ha-Kohen, pt. 5, Hoshen Mishpat, sec. 8 (S.V.ve-
khen yesh le-hokhi'ah), SHULHAN ARUKH. 
 243. Sefer Me'irat Einayim, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1, SHULHAN ARUKH. 
 244. See Amichai Radzyner, Appeal, in 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 283-84 (2d ed. 2007). 
 245. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 25:1–2. 
 246. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1. 
 247. See Radzyner, supra note 244, at 283. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 284. 
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influential of these tribunals is the Rabbinical Court of Appeals of the 
Chief Rabbinate, established in Jerusalem in 1921.250 
Either party or the trial court can take the initiative to reverse a 
judgment that they believe is erroneous.251 In a legal system that includes 
appellate tribunals, however, the right to request a reversal by the trial court 
would be superfluous because the authority to reconsider the judgment is 
already vested in the appellate court.252 
In fact, the rules of procedure of the Israeli rabbinical courts specify 
that if there is a suspicion that a court has erred in rendering its judgment 
the court itself can take the initiative to reverse the judgment and invite the 
parties to reconsider the case.253 Conversely, the parties do not have the 
right to request that the trial court reverse all errors in judgments but rather 
only those based on new evidence or arguments.254 Furthermore, the right 
of the trial court to reverse its erroneous judgment exists only when the 
case is not before the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. After the Rabbinical 
Court of Appeals renders a final judgment, the trial court is not authorized 
to reconsider the case255 because a rabbinical court functioning within a 
legal system that includes an appellate tribunal must (by law) respect the 
decision of the appellate court.256 
6. Claim Preclusion 
An important rabbinical authority, R. Shimeon b. Zemach Duran, the 
Rashbatz, a North African rabbi of the fourteenth century, was asked about a 
defendant’s demand that the plaintiff aggregate all of his claims and remedies 
into one cause of action so that the plaintiff may not reopen the case later.257 
In other words, the defendant was seeking an ancient version of claim 
preclusion that would prevent the plaintiff from later reopening the case. 
Rashbatz wrote that no legal ground existed to compel the plaintiff to 
assemble all of his claims against the defendant into one cause of action. 
According to Rashbatz, the plaintiff has the right to first sue based on one 
 
 250. There was intense controversy among rabbis in Israel and abroad regarding the establishment 
of such a tribunal. “The main claim of its opponents was that such an institution was an innovation 
which contradicted traditional halakhah.” Id. 
 251. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 17:8. 
 252. SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 440. 
 253. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 128. 
 254. These cases cannot be examined by the appellate court, but the parties have the right to request 
reversal of an erroneous judgment rendered by the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. See SHOCHETMAN, 
supra note 210, at 440. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See CA 682/81 Fried v. Fried 36(2) PD 695, 698-99 [1982] (Isr.). 
 257. RESPONSA TASHBETZ 2:2. 
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claim only and to later sue based on other claims. The plaintiff has the right 
to divide one cause of action into different stages and to sue separately 
based on different claims because he or she may have legitimate reasons 
for doing so. Rashbatz presented some of these reasons. First, the plaintiff 
may have witnesses who can appear in court readily to testify about one 
claim, whereas the witnesses related to another claim may be far and 
cannot appear in court immediately. In this situation it would be unjust to 
prevent the plaintiff from submitting a cause of action until he can include 
all of the claims. Second, the plaintiff may not want to submit all claims in 
the beginning because the defendant might later admit the second claim. 
Third, the plaintiff may believe that he and the defendant might be able to 
compromise and reach a settlement regarding the second claim. Fourth, the 
plaintiff may not at first know of all the potential claims he has against the 
defendant. All of these reasons are considered sufficient for dividing one 
cause of action into different claims, so that claim preclusion does not 
apply in these cases. The defendant can prevent the plaintiff from splitting 
the cause of action only if he can show that doing so would cause damage 
to his property.258 
If splitting a claim is likely to damage the defendant, the court will 
sustain the defendant’s objection to dividing the cause of action. For 
instance, if the plaintiff files a claim of non-ownership of land against a 
defendant who has possession of the disputed land and the plaintiff asks the 
court to address the issue of the land’s ownership at a later stage, the 
defendant’s objection would be sustained because delaying the judicial 
decision about ownership could affect the value of the land, which would 
decrease due to the rumors about the ownership dispute.259 
Another North African rabbi of the sixteenth century, Radbaz, 
commented that the court should not permit the plaintiff to split his or her 
claims if the judge believes that the plaintiff wants to harass the defendant 
repeatedly with one claim at a time in order to make the defendant take a 
new oath each time.260 In such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason 
to split one cause of action, contrary to the cases mentioned by Rashbatz.261 
 
 258. Rashbatz's opinion was accepted by the main halakhic codifiers. See Rema, Hoshen Mishpat, 
SHULKHAN ARUKH, § 24. 
 259. See RESPONSA RASHBA 1:1077. 
 260. RESPONSA RADBAZ 4:1281. 
 261. Therefore there is no contradiction between Rashbatz and Radbaz, as explained in PITHEI 
TESHUVA, SHULKHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat, Sec. 24. 
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B. The Rationale: Truth Finding as a Major Element of Justice 
The concept of non-finality of judgments is rooted in the central 
feature of the Jewish legal system: the discovery of truth. The late Israeli 
Supreme Court Justice, Haim Herman Cohn, stated that Jewish law is 
without parallel among other systems of law in that the discovery of truth is 
an element of justice and the law is subordinated to it.262 Jewish law is 
religious law, and as such the central idea guiding the judge is truth-based 
litigation, an objective imposed on the judge as a religious obligation.263 
This obligation has implications on several levels.264 Discovery of the truth 
is perhaps the most central value to shaping the approach of Jewish law to 
the nature of litigation.265 
As I have written elsewhere, Jewish law constitutes a normative 
system in which religious commandments inform adjudication.266 The 
judge is responsible not only to the litigants standing before him but also to 
God. This system differentiates Jewish law from secular systems operating 
in the liberal Western tradition. In modern Western legal systems, judges 
must render a clear and unequivocal decision on any legal question brought 
before them, and they are not perturbed by the possibility that their rulings 
might later be deemed mistaken.267 By contrast, Jewish law does not 
impose an unqualified duty on the judge to render a decision. The Talmud 
praises the judge’s responsibility and duty to render true justice: “he who 
judges in truth, even for a single hour, the Writ gives him credit as though 
he had become a partner to the Holy One, blessed be He, in the act of 
creation.”268 At the same time, Talmudic sages stressed that rendering 
judgment was an act carrying transcendental significance that required the 
judge to assume solemn religious responsibility for a ruling that might turn 
out to be mistaken.269 
The Jewish rabbinical courts, the function of which is to establish the 
truth, were not designed to carry out proceedings in a conflict-solving style, 
as were the common law systems. Rendering a true judgment based on true 
 
 262. See H. COHN, HAMISHPAT [The Court] 119 (1992). 
 263. YUVAL SINAI, THE JUDGE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN JEWISH LAW 469-70 (2009). 
 264. See id. (discussing the repercussions of that obligation on the formulation of the modes of 
court intervention in judicial proceeding, in view of the sources of Jewish law). 
 265.  See id. 
 266. See Yuval Sinai, The Religious Perspective of the Judge's Role in Talmudic Law, 25 J.L. & 
RELIGION 357, 357 (2009-2010). 
 267. In Judge Pollock's opinion, see Judicial Caution and Valour, 45 L.Q. REV. 293, 296-97 
(1929), a judge's readiness to risk a mistaken judgment is necessary to promote the creative 
development of the law. 
 268. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 10a. 
 269. See, e.g., Sinai, supra note 266. 
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facts is the main function of the Jewish judge. Consequently, an incorrect 
judgment is absolutely null and void, and it may be said that the judge has 
not finished his work until he gives a true judgment. Therefore, if the judge 
finds that his judgment is incorrect, he must reconsider the case and meet 
his obligation to render true judgment.270 
The litigant’s right to reopen a judgment raises the following question: 
would inconsistencies in judgment undermine the court’s prestige and 
public respect for its decisions?271 The sages were aware of this matter and 
discussed it in the Talmud.272 As we have seen above, the accepted 
approach is that a judgment can usually be reversed if it is incorrect. The 
first judgment will be reversed not only in cases involving clear evidence 
of error but also in cases where the judgment’s accuracy is placed in doubt 
by new evidence.273 This principle was justified by the view that the 
objective of a judgment in Jewish law is to reflect the truth.274 
CONCLUSION 
This Article confronts the common assumptions that a legal system 
cannot exist without some form of res judicata and that every legal system 
has produced a body of RJ law. We have seen other legal systems reject 
some of the main tenets of RJ. For instance, German law includes RJ that is 
narrower in scope than that in common law systems. Jewish law rejects RJ, 
although it does include some diluted version of RJ. The Article also argues 
that the RJ rules raise difficulties and present many moral, conceptual, 
social, and cost-of-efficiency drawbacks. Res judicata rules also provide 
problematic incentives to the parties involved. However, the problems of 
RJ mentioned in the article do not necessarily imply a complete indictment 
of the concept of RJ, and some good arguments support at least a minimal 
concept of RJ. But the arguments presented in this article should lead to 
reconsideration of the contemporary broad-scope common law model of 
RJ.275 
 
 270. SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 425. 
 271. See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
 272. See Ziluta de'bay dina, in 12 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (1991). 
 273. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 429. 
 274. This is also why the argument of prestige of the court as grounds for RJ is not applicable. See 
Appeal 18 (1957), in 2 ISRAELI RABBINICAL COURTS DECISIONS 262, at 265. 
 275. In Sinai, supra note 132, I outline the basic elements needed for redesigning the rules of claim 
preclusion, proposing to abolish the strict and broad rule against splitting a cause of action that is being 
applied in contemporary common law, and argue in favor of a more lenient and flexible rule. The 
proposed model should seek to include in a single lawsuit only what is efficient to include in that 
lawsuit from the perspective of both the courts and the litigants, as it is not necessary to fully litigate all 
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An analysis of broad-scope RJ in common law reveals that the 
traditional justifications for RJ provided by common law jurists should not 
be considered the primary reasons why common law systems have 
accepted the doctrine of RJ in its broad scope. The relative weakness of the 
traditional justifications is manifest, especially in light of the strong 
arguments against RJ. A legal system that favors broad-scope RJ, as do 
common law systems, could merely reflect a principled approach that 
prefers such values as public interest, consistency, stability, and efficiency 
to truth finding. But in modern common law RJ is not applied consistently 
with these professed values that common law jurists use as justifications for 
the doctrine. To the contrary, the primary cause for accepting the rules of 
RJ in the Anglo-American systems can be best understood under the 
conceptual “conflict solving” approach of the adversarial system, whereas 
the traditional justifications serve more as rhetorical justifications. The 
main objective of the court in an adversarial system is not to ascertain the 
truth but to resolve disputes objectively and to choose between the 
contentions of law and fact laid before it by the litigants. 
An analysis of the conceptual contentions against RJ shows that RJ is 
inconsistent with some of the major aspects of the behavior modification 
model. Furthermore, RJ does not necessarily contribute to an economically 
efficient legal system. Conceptually, the effects of RJ are inconsistent with 
some of the main characteristics of the Anglo-American system itself and 
contradict many of the valued features of procedure, such as litigants’ 
authority and persuasion opportunities, correctness, revisionism, economy, 
and consistency. The litigants’ autonomy is especially disregarded with the 
application of claim preclusion, which forces the plaintiff to submit the 
subject matter of the entire case relating to the cause of action at one time, 
once and for all, including every remedy flowing from the cause of action 
based on the subject matter. The rules of RJ also limit the litigants’ 
persuasion opportunities by denying them the opportunity to persuade the 
court to reverse an incorrect judgment. In principle, as argued in the present 
Article, there is no reason why the rules of RJ could not be limited to the 
narrow question of whether the prior action actually decided the issues 
necessarily involved in awarding the judgment. According to this approach, 
RJ is a drastic measure and should be applied only in clear cases in which a 
matter has been directly litigated, when one “has had his day in court,” and 
ought not to be extended to matters that could or should have been raised 
and litigated in the first action. 
 
grievances arising from a transaction. In my proposal, the default rule permits splitting a single cause of 
action, with exceptions to the general rule. 
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The rules of RJ, especially those of claim preclusion, do not comport 
with the behavior modification model because they have a negative and 
harmful effect on the conduct of litigation. The rule of claim preclusion 
forces the plaintiff to aggregate into one lawsuit all the claims and remedies 
that may be developed from one cause of action, significantly aggravating 
the dispute between the parties. At the same time, under a more flexible 
system that allows splitting a cause of action, the plaintiff can pursue his or 
her claims in stages using legitimate strategic considerations and would 
therefore not be forced to press his or her claims to the utmost, as would be 
the case under the common law system. The court should allow the plaintiff 
to split the cause of action in such cases ex ante (when requested by the 
plaintiff at the beginning of the proceedings) or even ex post (when not 
previously requested). The rules of claim preclusion act as major obstacles 
to achieving a desirable behavior modification model of litigation and to 
reaching a settlement. This does not mean, however, that the court should 
always allow splitting claims. In Jewish law, the court could not (by law) 
permit the plaintiff to split his or her claims if the judge believes that the 
plaintiff is dishonest and wants to harass the defendant repeatedly with one 
claim at a time in order to damage the defendant. This limitation makes 
sense because in such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason to split 
one cause of action since the split would not contribute to the behavior 
modification of litigation. 
Forcing litigants to include all factually distinct claims in one action 
may have additional disadvantages, including a significant negative effect 
on cost efficiency for both the litigants and the courts since the parties are 
forced to litigate their potential claims to the utmost. By contrast, if the 
plaintiff is permitted to sue in the first stage for part of the remedies 
without the danger of the other remedies being blocked by estoppel, there is 
a reasonable chance that some plaintiffs may choose not to sue for the other 
remedies. An ex ante analysis of the rules of cause of action and issue 
preclusion shows that the broader the scope of the claim preclusion, the 
higher the costs of particular procedures will be, harming access to judicial 
decision making. Ex ante considerations of broad-scope claim preclusion 
may prevent plaintiffs from submitting their claims altogether because 
litigants need to aggregate all of their claims and remedies into one cause 
of action, which may increase trial costs to a prohibitive level. 
The RJ rules that prohibit the tribunal of first instance from 
reconsidering its decisions do not help prevent erroneous decisions and are 
not desirable from the perspective of either the behavior modification 
model or from the point of view of cost efficiency. By contrast, the 
procedural system of Jewish law allows the trial judge to reconsider his or 
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her decision and to render a revised decision if needed, which contributes 
greatly to an efficient judicial process of error correction. When trial courts 
are able to relitigate cases and to take advantage of information that 
litigants have about erroneous decisions the incidence of mistakes is 
reduced at a lower cost than that of error correction by appellate courts. 
Unlike the appellate judge, who learns the factual and legal grounds of the 
case at the appeal, the trial judge is familiar with the details of the case and 
needs to learn only the litigants’ arguments about the errors in his decision. 
After the trial, the defeated litigant has the time and a strong incentive to 
review his or her objections to the trial court’s decision. Introducing these 
objections to the trial judge at this stage results in an efficient process that 
gives the judge an opportunity to reconsider the decision. If given the 
opportunity to correct his or her mistakes after the trial, the judge is likely 
to take advantage of the opportunity in order to prevent undesirable 
reversals by the appellate court. Allowing relitigation in the trial courts 
would also compensate for the absence of reexamination of factual issues 
by the appeals court because in the trial court factual issues can be 
reconsidered more economically. 
The second model of RJ, the German model, does not recognize the 
concept of RJ in the broad sense used by the common law legal systems. 
The narrow scope of RJ in the German model seems superior to the broader 
rules of RJ that apply in common law, but the German model is also 
problematic from the point of view of cost efficiency. Some of the features 
of the Continental and German appellate process result in inefficient 
judicial error correction since the process does not provide for relitigation 
by the trial court. 
The third model, the Jewish law model, relies on the concept of non-
finality of judgments. Although RJ has some effect in Jewish law, the 
effect is minimal compared with the common law and Continental 
jurisdictions. In the Jewish legal system a judgment is always subject to 
revision, normally by the court that rendered it in the first place, if new 
evidence has come to light undermining the facts on which the judgment 
was based, provided that the party seeking to adduce such new evidence is 
not barred from doing so. Every judgment is also subject to revision for 
errors of law. The traditional, ancient concept of non-finality of judgments 
in Jewish law also applies in the contemporary rabbinical courts authorized 
in the modern State of Israel. Nevertheless, the acknowledged lack of 
finality in Jewish law arose at a time when no appellate-level court existed 
in the Jewish Law system. Once Israel established an appellate court 
process, the nature of finality changed (though a broader residual discretion 
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is left to trial adjudicators in religious courts to reopen cases that have not 
yet been appealed). 
Jewish law has long recognized the difficulties of allowing endless 
litigation between the same parties. Religious sages have sought a balance 
between the demand of justice that a case be reconsidered when the losing 
party argues that new evidence establishes the truth and the need to settle 
disputes without allowing them to drag on endlessly. As a result, the 
halakhic codifiers accepted an important limitation to ensure that disputes 
are eventually settled. These procedural rules are accepted in contemporary 
rabbinical courts authorized in Israel and instruct judges to ask the parties, 
after all the claims and evidence have been presented at trial, whether they 
have additional claims and evidence. If the parties declare that they have no 
further evidence or claims, the court will not accept further evidence or 
claims in the future, unless the litigant gives a credible explanation for the 
delay. As a result of this rule, in practice, few requests to reverse a 
judgment are submitted to the Israeli rabbinical courts. The trial court has 
the right to reverse its erroneous judgment only if the case has not been 
addressed by the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. After the Rabbinical Court 
of Appeals gives its final judgment, the trial court is not authorized to 
reconsider the case. 
Jewish law also adopts a balanced approach toward claim preclusion, 
both from the perspective of the behavior modification model and from the 
point of view of cost efficiency. In principle, the plaintiff has the right to 
divide a cause of action into different stages and to submit different claims 
because he or she may have legitimate reasons for doing so. Nevertheless, 
the court does not permit the plaintiff to split his or her claims if doing so 
would harm the defendant, or if the judge believes that the plaintiff is 
attempting to harass the defendant by submitting one claim at a time. The 
unique concept of non-finality of judgments in Jewish law is explained by 
its central feature, which is without parallel in the dominant legal systems 
of the West, whereby discovery of the truth is an element of justice to 
which all else is subordinated. The function of the Jewish rabbinical court 
is to establish the truth and not to solve conflicts. Rendering a true 
judgment based on true facts is the main function of the Jewish judge, and 
incorrect judgments are null and void. The work of a Jewish judge is not 
finished until he or she gives a true judgment. Therefore, if the judge finds 
that his or her judgment is incorrect the judge must reconsider the case and 
reverse it in order to fulfill his or her obligation to render true judgments. 
 
